By Maxime Gauin
JTW Columnist
11 October 2011
On October 20, 1921, France was the first major power to sign a peace treaty with the Kemalists recognizing Ankara’s government, after the first de facto recognition of May 1920. France even provided weapons and ammunition, which were used against the Greek invasion forces. Henry Franklin-Bouillon, a Centrist politician and chairman of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee, was the French chief negotiator. Contrary to legend, Franklin-Bouillon did not make unilateral concessions, still less by his own initiatives. On the contrary, mutual concessions were made, and Franklin-Bouillon was the (efficient executioner) of a policy decided by Aristide Briand, President of the Ministers Council (Prime minister), after a gradual change in both political milieu and public opinion.[1] The successor of Briand, Raymond Poincaré, sent a friend of Turks, Colonel Louis Mougin, as a representative to Ankara in 1922.[2] . . .
From October 25 to 30, 1968, President Charles de Gaulle visited Turkey, paid tribute to Atatürk (“Atatürk attained the greatest glory: the national revival”), and signed a bilateral agreement of cooperation in various fields.
By a remarkable coincidence, the French and Turkish ministers of interior signed in Ankara, on October 7, 2011, an important agreement on police cooperation. The agreement is devoted to fighting terrorism, drug smuggling, money laundering, and other kind of serious crimes. It also includes cooperation in the training of anti-riot police forces. Formalizing the close ties which have been forged during the last years between the police forces of the two countries, the text provides for an exchange of intelligence—especially against terrorism and drug smuggling—experts, and techniques, especially for forensic and technical police.
The sharing of intelligence is especially important for Turkey. It means that all information obtained by the Direction générale de la surveillance extérieure (DGSE; General Directorate of External Intelligence) or any other French agency on the activities of the PKK, DHKP-C, or any other terrorist group can be shared with Turkey. France has a long experience of terrorism, antiterrorism, and bilateral cooperation against terrorism. The probable disappearing of the Basque ETA will be largely due to the increasing Franco-Spanish cooperation since the agreement of 1984. In August 2001, the French counter-intelligence agency sent the FBI a file on Zacarias Moussaoui, a French al-Qaida terrorist of Moroccan origin. If the file would have been considered more carefully, the attacks of September 11 probably would had been prevented. Indeed, Moussaoui was arrested on August 16, 2001, and files on the future attacks were recorded in his personal computer.[3]
Concerning the PKK, the French police have shown their effectiveness during the last years. The eleven perpetrators of arson against Turkish-owned shops in 2007 were arrested in 2008 and sentenced in January 19, 2009, for the fires and some also for the fundraising of PKK activities; the chief of the group received five years in jail and a life-time exile (because he does not have French citizenship). A PKK terrorist who in 2008 hurled a Molotov cocktail at the Turkish representation to Europe’s Council in Strasbourg (killing or wounding no one, by chance) was sentenced to two years in jail in 2010. 18 other people were judged in Paris, in July 2011, for the fundraising of both PKK and TAK activities. An even more efficient fight, in both France and Turkey, can be expected in the context of the agreement signed on October 7.
However, contrary to some inaccurate information published in newspapers, the extradition issue is not directly concerned by the bilateral Franco-Turkish agreement. Before its signature, the French authorities already started to provide their Turkish counterparts information to make files of extradition incontrovertible, which would eventually be presented in front of French tribunals.
More regrettable is the fact that if the agreements of 1921 and 1968 were the result of a coherent policy decided from the top, the last step toward better relations was more the result of Mr. Guéant’s personal influence, of Turkish diplomatic efforts, and of demands by the French police and justice system. Despite having been Minister of Interior from 2002 to 2004, then from 2005 to 2007, Mr. Sarkozy personally paid little interest to the cooperation against PKK and DHKP-C. His words pronounced in Erevan, apparently without much preparation and led by a sudden internal (electoral) motivation, definitely does not lead to great optimism. The presence of Patrick Devedjian, former lawyer of Armenian terrorists in the 1980s, behind Mr. Sarkozy in Erevan is also self-explanatory.
On the other hand, it is fair to notice that as early as Friday morning, Jean-David Levitte, foreign affairs adviser to Mr. Sarkozy, called the Turkish embassy requesting a meeting with Ambassador Mr. Tahsin Burcuoğlu the next day in the afternoon to prevent a new crisis—contrary to the inaccurate information of some newspapers, asserting that Mr. Burcuoğlu came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by solely his own initiative. The same Mr. Levitte explained to the Turkish government, as early as May 2007, that the promises of Mr. Sarkozy to obtain the vote of the Armenian censorship bill in the Senate would not be carried out—this what actually happened. Similarly, Mr. Guéant denied in Ankara that Mr. Sarkozy gave an “ultimatum” to Turkey.
“Words fly away, but writings remain.” The agreement signed this month is in writing.
[1] Paul Dumont, Mustapha Kemal invente la Turquie moderne, (Bruxelles : Complexe, 1997), pp. 111-117 ; Alain Quella-Villéger, La Politique méditerranéenne de la France (1870-1923). Un témoin, Pierre Loti, (Paris : L’Harmattan, 1991), pp. 165-191.
[2] Paul Dumont, « À l’aube du rapprochement franco-turc : le colonel Louis Mougin, premier représentant de la France auprès du gouvernement d’Ankara (1922-1925) », in Paul Dumont and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (ed.), La Turquie et la France à l’époque d’Atatürk, Paris-İstanbul, ADET/Les éditions Isis, 1981, pp. 75-106.
[3] « Zacarias Moussaoui— Ce que la DST a transmis au FBI », L’Express, June 11, 2002, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/ce-que-la-dst-a-transmis-au-fbi_498789.html (also see the embedded copy of the google translated version below); The 9/11 Commission Report , pp. 273-276, http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (also see the embedded copy below); Bill Gertz, Breakdown. How America’s Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2002), p. 33.»
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Comments by Sukru Server Aya
I thank both Mr. O.E. Lutem and Maxime Gauin, for their very valuable comments.
I submit Page 97 from my new “pocket book” (available on order in English or Turkish) and also in DVD format, and ask the super hypocrite Mr. President, to explain to Armenians also his true fidelity, which is clearly visible in the Sykes-Picot map given below. 1916 is one year after 1915 and France had already wiped out Armenia completely! Does he have a face?
Travesty is not limited to street hookers; the political ones are much worse and harmful to countries and generations to follow. Sukru S. Aya
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