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Monday, May 31, 2010

3098) Exclusive Interview With Ara Baliozian: " I Would Identify Myself As Someone Who Does His Utmost To Be An Honest Witness"

Posted on 1:48 PM by Unknown
Armenian papers used to publish his commentaries/book reviews, but they have been turning down his works lately. Most of his notes are highly criticized by Armenians in general and they do anything and everything to silence him and even managed to bar him from many sites.

He always says if he is wrong, correct him, but do not silence him.

Here are few more lines from Ara:

Can an Armenian and a Turk engage in dialogue?
Not if either one or both are brainwashed.
*
Can two Armenians engage in dialogue?
I have to see it to believe it.
*
Dialogue is possible only between two enlightened people. To a brainwashed Armenian, an enlightened Armenian might as well be a Turk. I speak from experience


I believe being criticized is one of the best rewards a writer gets.

Ara is a terrific writer and I have been addicted to reading his work we receive every day of the year for our site.

I remember it was several years ago. Ara did not sent any his posts for a day or two, then for a week, then for a month that we were really concerned about him.

Lara had to ask Murat to visit him in Canada to see if he is OK.

We were all relieved that he happened to be on a trip to Italy for a holiday Murat found out from a lady at his house.

I just wanted to get to know him better by interviewing him and he kindly accepted, even provided his recent photos for this post.

Seda Goulizar
Editor
http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/


Seda: What was the first piece you ever wrote?

Ara: In Venice in 1954 -- a school composition. it was derivative and not worth discussing or, for that matter, remembering On the other hand, my first book, titled THE ARMENIANS, came out in Toronto in 1975. It was a comissioned work that I wrote in 3 months. 90% of it is recycled propaganda, and 10% unreadable nonsense. It has sold more copies than any other book I have written since -- including translations of such classics as Zarian, Zohrab, and Zabel Yessayan.



Seda: Where do you get most of your ideas and what is your favorite thing you've written?

Ara: I get my ideas from my own personal experiences and encounters and the books I read. My favorite book is FRAGMENTED DREAMS, which is out of print. it was used as a textbook in schools but was banned when parents protested on the grounds that it was not suitable for tender minds -- in other words, it did not contain chauvinist propaganda.

Seda: What do you think makes good writing and how do you make it interesting not boring?

Ara: Good writing is first and foremost readable, and it is brief enough not to bore the reader.

Seda: Why do you seem to prefer the solitude of logic and truth, versus the applause by duplicity and acting nicely in the herd ?

Ara: I prefer to please God (and I don't believe in God) than men (most of whom are programmed to prefer flattery to truth).

Seda: If you could have dinner with one person, dead or alive, who would it be and why?

Ara: Socrates -- a man after my own heart -- a man who is everything I am not.
My second choice would be J.S. Bach.


Seda: How would you describe yourself to someone who has not read any of your books or writings?

Ara: I would identify myself as someone who does his utmost to be an honest witness.

Seda: What would your ideal career be, if you couldn't be an author?

Ara: A concert pianist.

Seda: Can you share a little of your current work -maybe a new book with us please?

Ara: I have given up writing books -- or rather, publishers find me unmarketable. I remember once many years ago a New York literary agent told me: "You write literature, and literature doesn't sell.

Seda: Have you ever written anything that you thought would be controversial and found it wasn't?

Ara: When dealing with prejudiced readers -- and we have so many of them -- anything that deviates from their line of thinking, will be thought of as controversial.

After saying as much I would like to add that not all readers are prejudiced or narrow minded. I have a surprising number of readers who agree with me...with some reservations, of course.


Seda: Who is your target audience?

Ara: Myself when I was young, foolish, and brainwashed.

Seda: What else do you want your readers to know? Consider here your likes and dislikes, your interests and hobbies, your favorite ways to unwind — whatever comes to mind.

Ara: Only one thing: the skill to entertain thoughts that are not their own.

Seda: Give us three "Good to Know" facts about you. Tell us about your first job, the inspiration for your writing, any fun details that would enliven your tell-tale.

Ara: I hate to work for money; and I have had a dozen jobs (in department stores, factories, insurance head office, among others) that I have quit in anger or was fired from by disgruntled bosses when I failed to say "Yes, sir!"

I hate to dance (have danced only once in my life).

The only time I can manage to be friendly with people I don't know is when I am drunk.
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Saturday, May 29, 2010

3097) Letter From Permanent Representative Of Turkey To UN About Ex ANCA Chairman & Convicted Armenian Terrorist Mourad Topalian

Posted on 1:06 PM by Unknown
© This content Mirrored From  http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com © This content Mirrored From  http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com

General Assembly Fifty-Fifth Session

Agenda Items 156 And 164

Consideration Of Effective Measures To Enhance The Protection, Security And Safety Of Diplomatic And Consular Missions And Representatives Measures To Eliminate International Terrorism

Security Council

Fifty-Sixty Year . .





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Friday, May 28, 2010

3096) Turkey, Canada, and the Armenian Genocide

Posted on 10:04 AM by Unknown
© This content Mirrored From  http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com

By Jasmeet Sidhu, Toronto Star Blog, May 27 2010

The first thing I immediately noticed when I arrived in Turkey, was the price to get into the country. While British and American VISAs were only about $20, Canadians had to pay a whopping $60 for a VISA to enter the country. I never really thought about why, until we met with members of the Turkish foreign ministry in Ankara, Turkey.

Here in Turkey with my Peace and Conflict studies class to learn more about this dynamic and culturally rich country in the face of today's changing geopolitics, one topic that inevitably came up time and time again in our various meetings with Turkish officials was the Armenian genocide. And the discussions certainly took a more interesting turn when we revealed to people that we were Canadian
. . .

Thus far, Canada's parliament is the only one in the world that has formally recognized the killing of Armenians in Turkey during the First World War as genocide.

© This content Mirrored From  http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com Meeting at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara, Turkey

At the time in 2004, the Turkish foreign ministry released a statement, declaring "Some narrow-minded Canadian politicians were not able to understand that such decisions based on ... prejudiced information, will awaken feelings of hatred among people of different [ethnic] roots and disturb social harmony."

So when we met with members of the Turkish foreign ministry in the capital, Ankara, we weren't sure what to expect. Though we hadn't told them that this was a topic that we specifically wanted to discuss, as if reading our minds, an Armenian historian who had once worked in Canada joined our meetings, and the discussion inevitably went towards the Armenian genocide for the majority of the meeting. It was a fairly amicable and pleasant meeting, however, with an obvious agenda on their side to get their story across to Canadian students who would inevitably be discussing their thoughts with other Canadians (like I am right now).

The narrative that the foreign ministry put forward was emphasizing a lack of intent, and relying on the legal definition of the genocide to put into question "the events of 1915" as they were referred to in the meeting. Indeed, "genocide" was not even a legal term back in 1915 and the convention on genocide did not exist until 1948, so how can one declare a genocide to have happened?

Also, genocide needs intent to eliminate an entire groups of people. This, one member of the Turkish foreign ministry declared, did not exist. As well, they argued, Turkey has always been open about this issue and has argued for a joint historical investigation with Armenia to discover what really happened in 1915, but Turkey claims that Armenia are not open to the process or willing to open its private records on the event. Probably the most fascinating part of the discussion was when the foreign ministry urged us to be "Canadian" and live up to "Canadian values" by having an open mind and listening to both sides of the story. They argued that they were being accused of the most heinous crime and urged a proper historical investigation before parliaments pass judgments on controversial aspects of history, for which they have no role.

I walked away from the meeting not necessarily sure what to believe, but feeling compelled to read and research more about this dark aspect of Turkish history. And I suppose that was the real purpose of this meeting, whether we had just heard propaganda or the "memory record of another people" as it was called -- to not depend on simply just one side of the story, and to be your own critic of events and issues by doing the research yourself and coming to the best possible conclusion you can.

Jasmeet Sidhu is a graduate of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto. She worked for the Star in the radio room last summer, and writes a blog for the Star on climate change, where she covered the UN Climate Change conference in Copenhagen. In mid-June she will join the Star's summer intern program. Follow Jasmeet on Twitter.


Keghart.com Editors welcomes Jasmeet Sidhu's article, but encourages its readers to respond to gross misconceptions that have appeared in her piece, such as Canada being the only country that has recognized the Genocide of Armenians, the Armenian archives not being open for studies, etc.
Armenian Genocide Resource Center Editors do not need to "encourage you on what to do since for the majority of the Turks = "Ignorance is Always Bliss"


Comments

Jurist Dr. Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer of Polish-Jewish descent, and Holocaust survivor coined the word "genocide" in 1933 specifically to describe the destruction of Armenians and the barbarity that befell upon them at the hands of the Turkish State.

Prior to coining the word genocide, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and world leaders referred to the race extermination of Armenians as "the Armenian holocaust".

Genocide denial is not just the simple negation of an act; it is much more the consequent continuation of the very act itself. Genocide should not only physically destroy a community; it should likewise dictate the prerogative of interpretation in regard to history, culture, territory and memory. As the victims, Armenians never existed.

Now more than ever the denial of the Armenian genocide must be responded to, for denial is intrinsic to the methodology of genocide. Genocide is denied even as it is practiced - as in Darfur.

From the beginning, the perpetrator seeks pretexts and justifications to conceal the real intentions. Thus, the extermination is referred to as 'transporting,' as 'deportation' or 'resettlement' - 'moving to secure places' or even as the 'final solution.' A verbal code is used to camouflage and thus deny the annihilation, even as it is being committed. Genocide without simultaneous denial is unthinkable - yes, even impossible.

The Turkish have not only murdered humans , destroyed an ancient culture and civilization, and rewritten history, but they continue to legitimize the act as well as the racist ideology that led to the act. This includes the legitimization of any and all stereotyping of the Armenian people as a dangerous enemy, as a deadly bogeyman in the closet. Denial is the final step in the completion of a mass extermination - and the first step towards the next genocide.

If genocide is committed in Ruanda or Sudan, it is done with the knowledge that the rest of the world will only watch and then forget. They look to Turkey and think themselves safe in the assumption that their actions will likewise remain unpunished!

The accountable powers-that-be rhetorically ask - as Hitler did just before invading Poland - 'Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?'

Engraved on a the wall at the US Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hitler_Armenian_Quote.JPG

The Turkish state must be held accountable for its crimes of genocide - the UN convention on prevention and punishment for the crime of genocide (which references the Armenian genocide) fully applies on Turkey.

The Armenian genocide like the Jewish genocide both occurred before the 1948 UN Convention (which references the Armenian genocide).

Posted by: Berge Jololian | 05/27/2010 at 12:04 AM

Contrarily to what members of the Turkish foreign ministry were saying in that meeting, the Armenian genocide was indeed a premeditated and calculated act carried out by the Turkish government at that time.

Armenians from all over Anatolia, from Constantinople (Istanbul) to the most isolated Armenian village in historic Armenia, were taken to the desert and were killed in some of the most brutal ways possible, or were starved to death. 1.5 million Armenians out of a pre-war population of 2 million were systematically massacred in 1915... The intent was indeed there, such a considerable population cannot be eliminated simply "by accident".

This greatly inspired Hitler, who rallied his colleagues towards his genocidal cause by saying "who today remembers the annihilation of the Armenians"? Thankfully, Canada is among the many countries that do remember.

Posted by: David Kojah-Oghlanian | 05/27/2010 at 12:16 AM

Dear Jasmeet Sidhu,

Canada is not the only nation in the world recognized the genocide.. There are over 20 nations, including the EU and many other trade unions.. not to mention over 40 US states.. and countless number of genocide scholars.. Stating otherwise that a genocide has never occurred is going against the years of research and work done by these scholars who have without any bias or political motives concluded that it was a genocide against Armenians.

Intent of genocide is widely documented, evidence can be found in archives, newspapers, eye-witness accounts, pictures, videos, including skulls and bones. There is no arguing about that.

Just because the term genocide didn’t exist at the time, doesn’t mean something like a genocide couldn’t of happen. In fact, back in September 10, 1895 before Armenian Genocide memorial day of April 24, 1915, the New York Times published an article calling the events against the Armenians, not a genocide, but rather a Holocaust, and this is exactly 50 years before WW2.. This archived article is free for the public download..

http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9D05E5DD113DE433A25753C1A96F9C94649ED7CF

Posted by: Ari | 05/27/2010 at 02:19 AM

I would suggest that you read The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East, by Robert Fisk. There is a great chapetr there on the Armenian Genocide. It is always a great idea to do your research and find out the truth for yourself.

Posted by: Arin Gharakhanian | 05/27/2010 at 04:20 PM

Could you please tell us how much Canada is asking for visa for Turkish people and how difficult is to get it.

Posted by: Just asking | 05/27/2010 at 05:09 PM


  1. The writer's age and time of "selective reading", shows that she read only a few sources "she was directed to read". She should be the fourh of the Young Scholars I have written my short reply: Armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2010/05/3094-question-to-all-of-young-hasty.html If she and the ignorant Canadian Govenment and Parliament cannot prove that my evidences are fictitous or wrong, then it must be THEM doing wrong. I wish to make no reference to Ankara Government and their members, who are equally ignorant and have no depth of knowledge under their positions.
  2. There is a "mountain of authentic knowledge, articles, books" in this blog site, and unless you read the other side, you cannot be a decent scholar or peace defender!
  3. I strongly suggest that she further at least reads posting Armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2008/10/2610-genocide-lies-need-no-archives.html and distribute copies with my compliements to Canadian Government and parties who have been brainwashed to believe fabrications of myths.
  4. For years NO ONE COULD refute my statements and evidences I have provided. She is free to enjoy the applause and togetherness of the lynching mob, or the loneliness and satisfaction for defending truth and decency. I am afraid she is not even aware of over 2000 excerpts in my books "The Genocide of Truth" just a click away....but she find herself qualified to give big talks... SO EASILY?

Sukru S. Aya


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Thursday, May 27, 2010

3095) TESEV Panel Notes by Sukru Aya: Recent Developments In Turkish – Armenian Relations - Istanbul-Turkey 28 May 2010

Posted on 11:47 AM by Unknown
© This content Mirrored From  http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com
Turkey – Armenia: Moving on?
28 May 2010, Friday, 09.30-13.00 / TESEV, Bankalar Cad. No:2 Kat:2 Karaköy
There will be English-Turkish simultaneous translation throughout the event.

On Friday May 28th, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and the Yerevan-based Caucasus Institute will jointly organize a panel on the recent developments in Turkish – Armenian relations.
. .

The panel will also discuss their recent publication “Turkey-Armenia Dialogue Series: Assessing the Rapprochement Process” written by Aybars Görgülü from TESEV Foreign Policy Programme, and Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergey Minasyan from the Caucasus Institute.

The panel will start with opening remarks from Can Paker, TESEV Chairperson, and will be chaired by Dr. Mensur Akgün, TESEV Foreign Policy Programme Adviser. Erdal Güven, Thomas De Waal, Cengiz Aktar, David Hovhannisyan and Sabine Freizer will also take part.

Programme:
09.30 - 09.45 Registration

09.45 -10.00 Opening remarks: Can Paker - TESEV Chairperson

10.00 – 11.15 Panel I: Turkish-Armenian Relations: Quo Vadis?
Chairperson: Mensur Akgün – TESEV Foreign Policy Programme
Speakers: Aybars Görgülü – TESEV Foreign Policy Programme
Alexander Iskandaryan – Caucasus Institute
Erdal Güven – Radikal Newspaper

11.15 - 11.30 Coffee break

11.30 – 13.00 Panel II: Will Challenges Halt Rapprochement?
Chairperson: Markar Esayan – Taraf Newspaper (tbc)
Speakers: Thomas De Waal – Carnegie Endowment
Cengiz Aktar – Bahçeşehir University
David Hovhannisyan – Retired Ambassador
Sabine Freizer – International Crisis Group

RSVP: Nurgül Çelebi, +90-212-292 8903 (ext 111), nurgul@tesev.org.tr

*TESEV Foreign Policy Programme would like to thank the Consulate General of Sweden Istanbul, Black Sea Trust Fund, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Association Turkey Office and its High Advisory Board Members for their support towards this project.



Action No. 2 - Free Workshop and hospitality for selected guets, (who pays ?)

THURSDAY, MAY 27

17:00-18:30 Opening Event: Reflections on Art, Language, and Memory
Moderators: Osman Kavala (Anadolu Kültür), Banu Karaca (Sabancı University)
Silvina Der-Meguerditchian: “The Texture of Absence”

Helin Anahit (Middlesex University): “Fading Voices: A Project Based on Anatolian Polyglot Folk Tradition of Coffee Cup Readings”

19:00 RECEPTION


FRIDAY, MAY 28

9:30-10:00 COFFEE / TEA

10:00-12:00 I. Belonging and Otherness in Literature
Chair: Jale Parla (Bilgi University)
Discussant: Marc Nichanian (Sabancı University)
Arlene Avakian (University of Massachusetts Amherst): “Baklava as Home: Exile and Arab Cooking in Diana Abu-Jaber’s Novel Crescent”
Alparslan Nas (Sabancı University): “Mıgırdiç Margosyan: Togetherness of Autobiography and the Novel on the Road to ‘Minor Literature’: Toward Becoming-Minor in Turkey”

Efe Çakmak (Columbia University): “Literature is Guilty: Edib, Humanism, Colonialism”
Sema Bulutsuz (Istanbul University): “Places and Symbols of Collective Memory in Leyla Erbil”

12:00-13:30 LUNCH BREAK

13:30-15:30 II. Political Translatability

Chair: Bülent Bilmez (Bilgi University)]
Discussant: Umut Azak (Okan University)
Sanem Salgırlı (Marmara University): “Internal Colonialism at Large: Medical Language in the Construction of the Turkish Nation-State”
Kelda Jamison (University of Chicago): “Public Kurdish and the Politics of Legitimate Language in Turkey”
Armen Grigoryan (Analytical Center on Globalisation and Regional Cooperation, Yerevan) “Language of Politics, Intellectuals and Nation-Building”
Phil Gamaghelyan (Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation, Boston): “Including the Other: De-Constructing the ‘Us vs. Them’ Dichotomy in Turkish-Armenian Conflict”

15:30-16:00 COFFEE / TEA

16:00-18:00 III. The Roles and Discourses of Intellectuals
Chair/Discussant: Fikret Adanır (Sabancı University)
Seyhan Bayraktar (University of Zurich): "Politics, Memory, Language: Changes, Continuities and Breaks in the Discourse about the Armenian Genocide in Turkey"
Ayda Erbal (New York University): “MeaCulpas, Negotiations, Apologias: Revisiting the ‘Apology’ of Turkish Intellectuals”
Bilgin Ayata (Johns Hopkins University): “Critical Inquiries on Reconciliation Discourses in Turkey”
Ferhat Kentel (İstanbul Şehir University): “Facing Turkey's Past: Healing and Ailing”


SATURDAY, MAY 29
9:00-10:30 IV. Linguistic Multiplicity
Chair: Erol Köroğlu (Boğaziçi Üniversitesi)
Discussant: Valentina Calzolari (University of Geneva)
Alice von Bieberstein (University of Cambridge): “Intimate Abject: The Turkish Language within the Armenian Diaspora in Berlin”
Nona Shakhnazarian (Kuban Social and Economic Institute): “‘In Russia we are Muslims, in Turkey - Gyavurs…’ Black Sea Frontier Zone, Soviet Era Deportations, and the Language of Marginalization”
Christine Allison (University of Exeter): “Works of Memory in Kurmanji: Contemporary Turkey and Soviet Armenia”

10:30-11:00 COFFEE / TEA

11:00-12:30 V. Memory Works A
Chair: Haldun Gülalp (Yıldız Technical University)
Discussant: Biray Kolluoğlu (Boğaziçi University)
Yektan Türkyılmaz (Duke University): “When Victims Become Rulers: The Armenian Regional Government in Van Province (May-July 1915)”
Talin Bahçıvanoğlu (Humboldt University at Berlin): “Dersim: A Lived Environment from the Perspective of the Armenian Witnesses”
Ramazan Aras (University of Western Ontario): “Language, Body and Sovereignty: Memories of Incarceration, Corporeal Punishment and Resistance from the Prison of Amed/Diyarbakır in the 1980s”

12:30-14:00 LUNCH BREAK

14:00-16:00 VI. Memory Works B
Chair/ Discussant: Arzu Öztürkmen (Boğaziçi University)
Burcu Yıldız (Istanbul Technical University): “Performing Home Through Performing its Music: Onnik Dinkjian and his Dikranagertsi (Diyarbakır) Music”
Laurence Ritter (Caucasus Institute, Yerevan): “Converted and Hidden Armenians in Turkey: Silent Voices of the Past into the Present Days”
Leyla Neyzi (Sabancı University): “Remembering 1915: Language Use in Postmemories of Turks, Kurds and Armenians in Turkey”
Louis Fishman (City University of New York): “Remnants of the Past/Present: Jews, Greeks, and Armenians as Historical/Living Artifacts”

16:00-16:30 COFFEE / TEA

16:30-18:00 VII. Cultural Translatability
Chair: Hülya Adak (Sabancı University)
Discussant: Şenay Özden (Koç University)
Defne Ayas (Blind Dates Project): “Blind Dates: Challenges and Troves of a Curatorial Process”
David Kazanjian (University of Pennsylvania): “Kinships Past, Kinship’s Futures”
Ruken Şengül (The University of Texas at Austin): “Lost in Translation, Or Found? Contesting Kinship, Community and State in the East through the Institution of Kirvelik”

PARALLEL EVENTS

a) May 28, Friday 19:00 Tütün Deposu
Exhibit Opening: “Talkin Openly” (by Helin Anahit)

b) May 30, Sunday 17:30 Cezayir Meeting Hall
Panel: “Talking Openly: You, Me and the Others” (organized by Helin Anahit)
Moderator: Ayşe Öncü (Sabancı University)
Asuman Suner (Istanbul Technical University)
Ayfer Bartu (Boğaziçi University)
Cengiz Aktar (Bahçeşehir University)
Ferhat Kentel (Istanbul Şehir University)
Zafer Yenal (Boğaziçi University)



Comments From The Panel by Sukru Server Aya

- Conference was attended in the form of a round table talk, workshop and was carried orderly and timely.

- TESEV speakers said that they will not discuss genocide but will elaborate on the status of protocols and chances of revival.

- However, every TESEV referred to the fact that "genocide " is a fact and that Armenian government will not discuss it. Guest speakers, said nothing new, other than wishful thinking. Almost all Turkish speakers have been to Erivan several times, and more or less they argued that Turkey should not be part in the Karabagh conflict and should open borders and establish diplomatic relations.

- Orhan Cekic, referred to the Armenian constitution and said how an agreement can be established, when Armenian demand on apology for genocide, demand of land and restitution stays valid. TESEV speakers replied that these demands are not mentioned in the protocols and hence they should be neglected. They also said that forty countries' parliaments have acknowledged genocide and Turkey will understand this in time. Orhan Cekic said that European Court of Justice's 2004 verdict contradicts this statement and that there is no judicial verdict and that the Armenian side keeps away from any friendly debates.

- Dr. Mustafa Atac, said that we really do not need delegates from overseas countries to tell us what to do with our neighbors. He said, if they and diaspora would not poke their fingers, there would be no problem with Armenia or Armenians.

- Hikmet Ersoy, from Turkish Forum said that he lived long years in Boston and truly the personal friendly relations are effected when diaspora authorities intervene and avoid any friendship. He said that unless diaspora is kept out, there can be no reconciliation because they have benefit in this dispute.

- Sukru Aya, said that despite the program every speaker referred to genocide as a fact. He said that it is a fact, but that the documents at hand which they can see, prove that it was the Armenians encouraged by super powers, who did the crime, but what has passed has passed and we as Turks have no no problem with Hagop or Harut and Armenians of Turkey or Armenia with whom we lived together for a thousand years. Aya pointed out that protocols were prepared by persons not knowing the subject and had no chance, since they left out Azerbaijan and diaspora. He said that a vehicle or table on two legs cannot stand, it should have had four wheels.

- In the second session Aya said that his book is on the internet for over two years and that the biggest assistance he gets is from "decent Armenians from Turkey" and that we are all struggling for the truth, whatever it may be. Aya told the audience that in the past 6 years the blog site has posted some 60.000 pages of knowledge on this subject, over 200 books in the E-library and has almost three hundred articles. Those interested should read and learn first, but
unfortunately no one does it. Aya also asked what will happen with the demands on genocide, restitution (which was settled in 1937) land and slanders of diaspora will happen. He asked if the genocide museums and monuments will turn into art museums.

Aya said that diaspora made an industry out of it and they will not agree to any settlement which will cut their money circulation. Aya gave examples from U.S. Armenian press, dictating to Armenia what they should do and act within their wishes. Prof. Haluk Tarcan said that he lived for 30 years in Paris and as regards the ownership of land, he has evidence that pro-Turks have lived in this are since 13.000 and can prove it. Lale Gurman said that she represents a NGO but that the Turkish views are never voiced by scholars.

The meeting was an exchange of views and counter comments which have been left unreplied by speakers. The overseas guest speakers were more lenient and balanced compared to Turkish speakers who demonstrated their blind prejudice. Sumerolog Dr. Muazzez I. Cıg (95) said that we have lived for a thousand years together but in 1915 they were provoked by outside powers, they took arms and revolted against their homeland. And what has happened we should leave behind and live again as good neighbors and that Turks have no problems or antagonism against Armenians. The meeting closed at 1 p.m.

SSA

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3094) Questions To All Of The Young Hasty-Premature Scholars

Posted on 10:18 AM by Unknown
© This content Mirrored From  http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com

Prematured freshmen scholars jumping in the shallow "genocide swiming pool"! See where and how you are jumping and watch your heads fellows!

Comment on posting 3091, Ugur Umit Ungor ( Armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2010/05/3091-young-turk-mass-violence-regime.html ) (Replies also Post."3092) An Octuple Problem Of Representation 147 Years After* Representation, Headache, And The Square Wheel By Ayda Erbal" ( Armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2010/05/3092-octuple-problem-of-representation.html ) & 3093) Basic Disconnect—On The Part Of Armenians And Turks—That Is The Product Of Ignorance )( Armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2010/05/3093-basic-disconnecton-part-of.html )

I have to congratulate “Armenian Weekly” for finding new Turkish faces, and post their articles as if they are new discoveries and evidence on the genocide fanfare, which is cadets first lesson. I do not know what drives these “very young Turks (?)” to join the genocide band so easily and demonstrate not how much, but how little they have studied their lessons.

The end notes of Ungor, has selected names such as Akcam and Dadrian, but leavs out the whole world of pro or anti-Armenian writers, and proves that he was biased and selective in his studies, which is unethical for any scholar. Why he has not read even pro-Armenian writers,( to name but a few, Katchaznuni, Nassibian, Lalaian, Derunian, Dasnabedian, Pastermadjian, James Grabill, neutral ones such as Jeremy Salt, Selahi Sonyel, Guenter Lewy, Heath Lowry, Edwar Tashji), or “denialists”(?) such as McCarthy, Lewis, Shaw, Weems, Ataov and others?

The writer indicates that he has read Erich J. Zurcher’s “Turkey a modern history” but makes no reference to page 119 describing the Armenian complicity with Russians or 121, where it states that Armenians could provide no authentic documents to prove any state involvement.

Without going too deep in the subject, I hereby request an explanation of the slander of “genocide done by Turks to Armenians” and ask him, who is wrong? Is it the U.S. State records and what is written in the archives, or what the “mythomaniacs fabricate” to support their lies?

A- From Arthur & Sutherland Report:

- “At first we were most incredulous of the stories told as, but the unanimity of the testimony of alt witnesses, the apparent eagerness with which they told of wrongs done them, their evident hatred of Armenians, and, strongest of all, the material evidence on the ground itself, have convinced as of the general truth of the facts, first, that Armenians massacred Musulmans on a large scale with many refinements of cruelty, and second that Armenians are responsible for most of the destruction done to towns and villages. The Russians and Armenians occupied the country for a considerable time together in 1915 and 1916, and during this period there was apparently little disorder, although doubtless there was damage committed by the Russians. In 1917 the Russian Army disbanded and left the Armenians alone in control. At this period bands of Armenian irregulars roamed the country pillaging and murdering the Musulman civilian population.” >

B- From General Harbord’s report page 35:

-” We entertain no unfriendly dispositions toward the Armenian Republic of which Erivan is the center. For the present the league has no relations with this State and is not interested in it. Our knowledge concerning it is derived from rumors and indirect information. We know, however, so much to be a fact that the Armenians in the new State are carrying on operations in view of exterminating the Mussulman element in obedience to orders from the Armenian corps commander. We have had copies of their orders under our eyes. That the Armenians of Erivan are following a policy of extermination against the Mussulman and this wave of sanguinary savagery has spread right up to our frontier is also established by the fact of the presence within our borders of numerous Mussulman fleeing from death on the other side. The government of Erivan has, on the other hand, resorted to direct acts of provocation such as the practice of gunfire this side of the border.

Although the course of
these events the English encouraged on the one hand the Armenians in the attitude adopted by them against the Mussulmen or even stirred them up to it and, on the other hand, enumerating to us the outrages of the former and describing them as unbearable, they urged us to retaliate by attacking the neighboring State.

But we, putting up with the Armenian provocations, turned a deaf ear to the indignations of the English, feeling sure that the truth would make it known soon enough. As a matter of fact we thought we could detect in the attitude of the English trying to launch us upon an attack against Armenia, the plan of creating a situation of which they would avail themselves to dispatch their own troops into that country. All these maneuvers of the English were started by their officers and representatives after they saw themselves obliged to evacuate Caucasia”-.


CONCLUSION: Questions To All Of The Young Hasty-Premature Scholars:

  1. Who is the culprit of genocide, if any? Who is wrong or lying?

  2. Would you prefer to be a parrot and talk what you are taught and fed for, or a “free bird” fighting for the truth, like this blog!

  3. What a paradox: “truth defending Armenians originally from Turkey, exhibit how prejudiced and wrong Turks from Turkey can truly become, because they don’t read and don’t have the instinct to defend TRUTH



Sukru S. Aya - Istanbul 27.05.2010

Further References Included In Our Collection (Thanks To Tomahawk's comment for this post)

Here you can find the Curriculum Vitae of Ugur Umit Ungor, with on page 2:
"Zoryan Institute, travel grant for € 600,-, March 2003."
"Zoryan Institute, research grant for € 500,-, August 2003."

Local Copy Of Ugur Umit Ungor's Curriculum Vitae

And in his older work “A Reign of Terror” (www.ermenisoykirimi.net/thesis.pdf) he thanked these Armenians for “everything”: “the staff at the Zoryan Institute for everything”.

Local Copy Of His Thesis Called “A Reign of Terror”

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3093) Basic Disconnect—On The Part Of Armenians And Turks—That Is The Product Of Ignorance

Posted on 3:28 AM by Unknown
© This content Mirrored From  http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com The Armenian Weekly By Nanore Barsoumian

WATERTOWN, Mass. (A.W.)—On Wed., May 12, two Armenian American newspaper editors came together and spoke about their recent trips to Turkey. One was the editor of the Armenian Reporter, Emil Sanamyan, and the other, the editor of the Armenian Weekly, Khatchig Mouradian. Their experiences and impressions were telling, and at times controversial.
. .
The event was hosted by the Armenian Library and Museum of America (ALMA) in Watertown, and was sponsored by the ARF “Sardarabad” Gomideh of Boston. Marc Mamigonian of the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research (NAASR) moderated the event.

In March 2010, Sanamyan and Mouradian visited Istanbul, Ankara, Kars, and Ani in Turkey. During their trip they met with government officials, including Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, along with journalists, heads of political parties, community leaders, and citizens.

On April 24, Mouradian revisited Turkey. This time he had a different and specific purpose—as an activist, journalist, and scholar. Along with human rights activists, intellectuals, and outspoken citizens and critics, he participated in commemorating the killings of Armenian intellectuals in 1915. On April 24, in Istanbul, Mouradian gave a commemoration lecture, and the following day, on April 25, he took part in a symposium in Ankara on the Armenian Genocide and its consequences.

Mariam Stepanyan, ALMA’s executive director, made the opening remarks, welcoming the guest speakers and the 60-70 audience members “to this remarkable event when two rival Armenian newspaper editors come together… And I think even the topic itself is remarkable, of two Armenian journalists making the trip to Turkey during the year when we all commemorate the 95th anniversary of Armenian Genocide.” She then briefly spoke about ALMA’s traveling exhibit, “The Ongoing Armenian Genocide: Death, Denial and Desecration,” which was on display at the University of Rhode Island’s Feinstein Providence Campus Gallery until April 30th—an effort spearheaded by Berge Zobian of the Z Gallery—and had returned back to ALMA that same day, on May 12.

In his introduction, Mamigonian noted that the evening’s program did not have a formal title, “but in as much as it concerns the recent experiences of two Armenians currently living in the diaspora…this event is, more or less by default I guess, part of something that our speakers tonight might or might not call Turkish-Armenian dialogue, or Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, or some other more or less problematic descriptive term.” He said that “such undertakings need to be tempered with circumspection” and one should be wary of reducing “a nation of 70 million people, plus the many Turks who live outside of Turkey, to a single reductive stereotype of the same kind that we reject when it’s applied to Armenians.” He argued that there is a basic disconnect—on the part of Armenians and Turks—that is the product of ignorance. However, he added that “a nation does not become post-genocidal simply through the passage of time, but rather by making such systemic and institutional changes. Such changes include but probably are not limited to the recognition of the genocide that was committed,” and such “profound” changes have not taken place yet. He emphasized the need for better reporting of events, and translating commentaries and writings from Turkey and the Turkish-speaking world, in order to truly grasp what is currently happening in Turkey. “Both of our speakers tonight have made real efforts in this regard, both in their own writings and in presenting the writings of Turkish intellectuals and scholars in the pages of the newspapers they very capably edit,” he concluded.

Sanamyan’s presentation

Emil Sanamyan spoke about his March 2010 trip to Turkey, which was organized by a Turkish think-tank group in Ankara, TEPAV, and funded by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce, the largest business association in Turkey.

Sanamyan and Mouradian were the two Armenians in the group of Americans, which included other journalists, writers, and former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Morton Abramowitz. It was Sanamyan’s first trip to Turkey, and “the initial impression that I had was that this is going to be a brainwashing trip.”

His presentation was accompanied by a slide show. The first slide showed a photo taken at the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In it, Sanamyan, Mouradian, and a host are standing in front of a plaque; and on the plaque are the names of Turkish diplomats killed in the line of duty. “The Armenian-Turkish experience that we think of is the Armenian Genocide of 95 years ago and the after-effects of it. The Armenian-Turkish experience that a lot of Turks think of is the more recent experience—it’s the Armenian attacks against Turkish diplomats; the Armenian Genocide resolutions in Washington and other places… When I noticed that plaque…I felt the significance of the moment…coming out of a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Ministry… Most of those names are from the 70’s and the 80’s, the years of Armenian attacks against Turkish diplomats. The weight of history is very present, in Ankara even…”

Sanamyan spoke in detail about his visit to Ankara, about his thoughts and feelings upon noticing Talat Pasha Boulevard, and about “the omnipresent Ataturk,” whose portraits and statues seem to be perched everywhere.

As the group was preparing to meet with the Turkish president, one of the American journalists informed Sanamyan that Gul’s residence (Cankaya Palace) is located in Ankara’s Cankaya district—on land confiscated from the Armenian Kassabian family during the genocide. “This is how far up it goes in terms of Armenian heritage in Turkey,” said Sanamyan, “the Turkish president’s residence!”

Half the group chose to visit Kars and Ani, including Sanamyan and Mouradian. A small and “economically depressed town,” Kars seemed to be welcoming Armenian-Turkish negotiations and looking forward to the opening of the border in anticipation of Armenian tourists. A new hotel, the Hotel Grand Ani, had already been built and was ready for tourists.

In “one of the oddest moments of the trip,” in Kars, a man dedicated to Kars-Gyumri relations pulled out a gun during dinner to show his Armenian guests how prepared he was to protect them. “I asked if the safety was on…the gun was pointed in my direction,” added Sanamyan, extracting chuckles from the audience.

Sanamyan spoke about the church in Kars—now a mosque—which is almost entirely bare of the Christian art that once decorated its walls. The old Armenian Church still dominates the landscape, surrounded on four sides by mosques.

The former mayor of Kars is so dedicated to Armenian-Turkish relations, Sanamyan said, that he even ordered the construction of a massive symbolic monument of two figures standing face-to-face, one with a half-extended hand reaching out to the other. The original massive heads of the statues rest by their feet, and so do their heavy hands, and two disproportional hand-less figures, with lighter, smaller heads, stand erect today. “You can’t make up symbolism like that,” we heard someone say. The monument, still incomplete, is under threat of demolition today. “To be honest, I don’t want a monument like that to Armenian-Turkish anything,” said Sanamyan.

Sanamyan likened Ani to Mexico’s Tchitchenitza in its greatness, adding that it has the potential of becoming a major tourist destination in the region. The excavation and “restoration” has been limited, he said. The restored wall of Ani is a testament to the deliberate efforts to neutralize its history, by removing the age-old Armenian inscriptions and Christian symbols—though some still remain. Ani is still largely neglected. It costs only $4 to see the ruins.

The term “Armenian” has been omitted from all the placards that inform visitors of the history of the area, Sanamyan said. The Arshagidz, Pakradouni, and even Gamsaragan kingdoms are mentioned, but “Armenian” is simply absent.

In his conclusion, Sanamyan remarked: “The new elite of Turkey of the last decade is looking for a new modus operandi for Turkey, sort of graduating from the level of…just being an ally of the United States in the Cold War setting to being an independent player in the world, perhaps being one of the most powerful countries in the world… and they view the ‘Armenian issue,’ as they call it, as one of those things that the other major powers of the world have always used against them. So they’re trying to find a way not to have that issue used against them. I think it is incumbent on Armenians to make sure that this is done properly and not in a way that neglects Armenian interests.”

Mouradian’s presentation

Khatchig Mouradian’s presentation focused on his second trip to Turkey and on the Armenian Genocide commemoration events held there. But he first shared his emotional state amidst the ruins of Ani. “There is a moment, there is a sense of a feeling of homecoming when you really step into the ruins of Ani,” he said. An overpowering and overwhelming sensation that brought him back to the days of his youth in Lebanon, where books such as Anin Dzakhvetsav (Ani Has Been Sold) and Anien Kar Me Per (Bring Back a Stone from Ani) animated his teenage imagination. “At some point…I was just kneeling down and collecting some stones, and I was thinking—what am I doing? What is the significance of this? In face of the huge loss that our nation has suffered… I’m trying to console myself by collecting stones from Ani. There is a huge symbolism there that is overpowering and very difficult to overcome.”

Mouradian’s April trip to Turkey was brief, lasting only two days. He made sure to attend all the genocide commemoration events in Istanbul, and the conference in Ankara (the main reason for his trip). He arrived on April 24 at noon, and after spending a few minutes in his hotel room, was off to his first event—a gathering of Kurdish women commemorating the genocide—directly behind his hotel. “And there it was, a group of Kurdish women, sitting down in one of the squares—around them several activists and some onlookers curious about what was happening—and then what struck me were these pictures they were holding.” The women, whose sons had either been killed or lost, gathered in this location every Saturday “to remember and remind people about their plight.” On April 24, along with pictures of their loved ones, they held pictures of Armenian intellectuals arrested on April 24, 1915. “It was very difficult for me to see this… A very moving moment,” said Mouradian. The speakers there “emphasized the fact that the reason there are atrocities against Kurds is because atrocities against Armenians were left unpunished,” he added.

Mouradian next spoke about the second commemoration event at Haydarpasha Train Station, which was organized by the Istanbul branch of the Human Rights Association of Turkey. He talked about the small counter-demonstration organized by the Workers’ Party, where demonstrators held signs that read “The Armenian Genocide Is an Imperialist Lie.” “Of course, the Armenian Genocide is a ‘lie,’ but because they are the Worker’s Party they have to throw in the ‘imperialist’ part,” Mouradian said. The other event was at the Jezayir center, where Mouradian gave a lecture to a crowd of mainly Turkish intellectuals, some foreign journalists, and members of the Armenian-Turkish community.

“There was this need, and you really could feel it, among the Armenians in Turkey to commemorate the genocide… And not all of them were really able to come out and participate in these events openly. But in many cases you could see them outside the commemoration ring, watching us from outside. This need was very palpable and you could really sense it,” said Mouradian.

The bigger commemoration event was held at Taksim Sq., one of the busiest areas in Istanbul, and was attended by several hundred people. It was the one event where the word “genocide” was not spoken. “The Turkish intellectuals organizing this had decided to go another way,” Mouradian said, “and talk about the pain and suffering, and about how this was apparently a loss for the Turks as it was for the Armenians—because the Turks lost their neighbors, their tailors, their architects, their butchers, etc. So there was the obvious criticism that at some point it was difficult to tell who was actually the victim,” said Mouradian.

Question-answer period

After the presentations, members of the audience were eager to ask questions to the presenters. One, in particular, is worth noting. A man in the audience stood to ask whether it had ever crossed the editors’ minds that the Ankara conference on April 24-25 was organized by the Turkish government, as a means to improve their image—in essence suggesting that the visits served little to no purpose aside from Sanamyan and Mouradian assuming the roles of pawns in the hands of the Turkish government. To that Mouradian responded, “[Do you ever consider] that there might, just might, exist a Turk whose umbilical chord is not connected to the Turkish state? … If you had seen the people there…these were people who had spent their whole life in prison, and that would be an insult to them, and to those who critique [the government’s denial].”

As a response to another question, Mouradian said, “The Armenian issue began in Turkey and it’s going to be resolved in Turkey,” quoting Hrant Dink, and added, “Genocide recognition and political activism worldwide has a purpose: Turkey’s genocide recognition and addressing the consequences of the genocide. Therefore, we cannot ignore developments in Turkey, pretend they are not happening, by saying ‘a Turk is a Turk and nothing good will come out of all this.’”

When asked about Armenia’s current geopolitical importance, especially in light of the oil pipeline and its importance to Russia as a barrier state, Sanamyan’s response was, “It’s all relative,” while Mouradian argued that geopolitics is not simply determined by fate and geography, and that states can set their own geopolitical importance. But if Armenia poses as a country that “needs to feed its people,” how would one then expect others to give it any geopolitical importance, he added.
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Tuesday, May 25, 2010

3092) An Octuple Problem Of Representation 147 Years After* Representation, Headache, And The Square Wheel By Ayda Erbal

Posted on 2:33 PM by Unknown
© This content Mirrored From  http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com Perspectives / The Armenian Weekly April 2010

The Turkish edition of Vartan Artinian’s doctoral thesis, “A Study of the Historical Development of the Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1863,” submitted to Brandeis University’s Near Eastern and Judaic studies department in 1970, starts with a preface written by Rober Koptas, now a columnist for Agos and one of the editors of Aras Publications. Koptas quotes an anecdote
. . originally narrated by Hagop Djololyan Siruni in his Bolis yev Ir Teri (Constantinople and Its Role): “…The first year of National Constitution was being celebrated. It was a big day for Bolis Armenians. People were running from large neighborhoods to Beykoz with the boats they rented. The boats were stopping at Bosphorus, in front of the Dolmabahce Palace, and the passengers were shouting, ‘Long live Sultan!’”

It is told that Sultan Abdulmecid, asleep at the time, had woken up because of the noise and had summoned Sadrazam Ali Pasha immediately to his presence. The Sultan asks furiously, “What is this noise? What are these boats?”

“Your highness, the Armenians are very happy about the constitution granted to them and they are going to Beykoz to celebrate.”

“Ali, what did you do? What did you give them? Don’t you know they will become a headache soon?”

“Your highness, please do not get excited or worried. I gave them a square wheel. They are going to try to turn this wheel, but they won’t be able to. This way they will clash with each other and leave us alone” (volume 3, p. 87, my translation from Koptas’ translation to Turkish).

Koptas begins his piece by arguing that despite the impossibility of establishing the veracity of the anecdote, this famous story nonetheless exemplifies how Armenians perceived the Armenian Constitution that was ratified by the Ottoman Empire in 1863 after numerous changes. That same legal document preceded the two Ottoman Constitutions, of 1876 and 1908, the failure of which would first give way to the 1909 Adana Massacres, then to the hijacking of parliament by the Ittihadists.

While the anecdote tells a lot about how the Armenians of Istanbul embraced their newly ratified constitutional framework, it also tells a great deal about the imperial mind and how it anticipates and operates—an imperial state tradition almost akin to a second nature that minorities everywhere have great difficulty reading, understanding, and hence strategizing accordingly.

The anecdote was the first thing that came to my mind when I read the text of the protocols between Turkey and Armenia. 1 I could have also remembered the long 19th century of the Ottoman Empire and how that century was particularly emblematic of the Ottoman state elite’s periodic promises of institutional commitment on matters related to its non-Muslim subjects (citizens post-1908), followed by its periodic failures to keep its own promises. But the same century was also emblematic of an ever-growing Western Armenian quest for representation. This was a period in which the Armenian middle class and Armenian intellectuals in cities with large Armenian populations gained considerable ground against the centuries-old Amira [Armenian notables in Istanbul] domination in community and church affairs. The constitution was a result of not only a grassroots push for more representation in various community affairs, such as the management of schools, hospitals, and pious organizations, but also, to a certain extent, a result of interAmira competition especially between bankers and technocrats and their quest for regulation. But the decisive actors leading the movement for a written constitutional framework were the young intellectuals educated in European schools and equipped with liberal ideas on representation, delegation, and deliberation. The five years from 1855 to the final draft of 1860 would witness a fierce debate with intellectuals and guild members on one side, and powerful Amiras (such as Garabed Amira Balyan) trying to curtail their efforts for representation on the other.

As is hinted in the paragraph above, despite the fact that the National General Assembly2 would be suspended several times starting in 1860, the Ottoman Armenian Constitutional frame-work was the ultimate result of a long and legitimate struggle for representation, a now-forgotten achievement of a legal (and by extension also legalist) tradition among Western Armenians. There was also an organic connection between the Armenian Constitutional movement and Kanun-i Esasi of 1876, the Ottoman Imperial Constitution. Krikor Odyan, who was not only one of the closest friends but also the advisor of one of the architects of the Ottoman Constitution, Mithat Pasha; Vahan Efendi, the undersecretary of justice; and Hovhannes Chamich Efendi, a State Council member, were all members of the Ottoman constitutional commission. Although the Armenian Constitution was suspended for three years until 1866 because of the disputes between political and religious committees, there had been instances in the long history of the Armenian Church where Armenian religious authorities had welcomed civilian deliberation. For example, the Armenian Church decision (506 AD) to reject the Chalcedon Council (451 AD) bears the signatures of civilians as well as church leaders. 3 With this backdrop in mind, the protocols between Armenia and Turkey were a grim reminder of another loss during the Armenian Genocide and grand expropriation in the years after 1915: the almost complete eradication and disappearance of a legal tradition that takes issues of representation and deliberation rather seriously. Re-reading parts of Vartan Artinian’s thesis, the single major question that comes to mind in the context of the protocols is: How did Western Armenians end up in this painfully pre-modern, pre-constitutional, and almost tribal mindset with no serious political thinking, discussion, or debate about legitimacy, representation, and delegation? The whole endeavor, both with its pro- and anti-protocol colors, could be the opening line of a popular joke: “A benevolent organization, a grassroots political organization, some political parties, and a state find themselves on a deserted island…”

True, these organizations and the Armenian state elite have some representative power in other issues. But to what extent they have power to represent Western Armenians in an issue that concerns all Western Armenians—notwithstanding whether they are affiliated with a party or a benevolent organization—is debatable, to say the least. Instead of debating the limits of their jurisdiction for representation, these organizations chose to hurry to take positions pro- or anti-protocol. The word on the street was that the Armenian state was pressured to take a position and several organizations reacted to that pressure; there were also, of course, rumors about the political-economy of the whole thing, that the oligarchic elite of both the Armenian state and the diaspora were rushing to close the deal to their benefit. It looked like this kind of ersatz representation was all Western Armenian organizations could come up with in 95 years, carelessly letting otherwise trivial protocols redefine their positions vis-à-vis each other while testing their organizational, representational, and deliberative muscle—which, we saw, amounted to nothing. The Sadrazam, under the auspices of the international order, gave them a square wheel of a different kind; and, voila, they could not turn the wheel and, as expected, started to fight with each other. However, the discussion to be had was not whether a benevolent organization or a political party was pro- or anti-protocols; the real and much belated debate should have been one of a different order, a discussion about increasing the quality of political participation, cooperation, and several possibilities of a larger political representation via innovative and legitimate deliberative channels. After all, Ottoman Armenians did not only eat kebab and dance to kef music, they also happened to be the lawmakers of both their own immediate communities and of the Ottoman Imperial Constitution itself.

Surely genocide can explain certain issues, but there are others for which Western Armenians should take responsibility and think seriously, beyond partisan concerns, after a mere 95 years. Political partisanship and difference of opinion are good and indicative of the health of a community in general; however, there are issues that require utter care and responsibility, surpassing the boundaries of partisanship. After all, the differences are trivial compared to the size of the calamity itself, and the loss is too dear to be used in age-old partisan disputes. Despite the organizational difficulties that have also been pointed out by Armenian Weekly contributors Harut Sassounian 4 and Henry Dumanian5

, there’s still time to organize a better and much more democratic future both in the diaspora and Armenia proper if problems can be identified correctly.

From a theoretical point of view there are at least eight problematic areas of representation, some particularly Western Armenian in character, others directly stemming from the Armenian political experience in Armenia.

The most visible and most problematic area of representation is that concerning citizenship and the representative boundaries of the state of Armenia. There are two distinct but somehow intertwined issues that need attention, and they are wrongly perceived by most people, including the majority of Turkish intellectuals and journalists, as one problem: The rights of individual Western Armenians who are not, technically speaking, the citizens of Armenia, and the rights of Western Armenians as a community (concerning issues of communal ownership of several denominations).

To begin with, the state of Armenia does not have any jurisdiction whatsoever to represent the rights of individual non-citizen Western Armenians. Technically speaking, whatever it signs binds only its own citizens and nobody else. If anything, the aggregation of the rights of non-citizen Armenian individuals does not automatically make those rights national rights. Individuals’ claims in this domain, like in any other domain, are much closer to a larger class action rather than the action of a national entity as such. As we have seen from the recent Swedish decision once more, that class is larger and includes others such as Assyrians. There is also a major philosophical problem behind this reductionist perception of the individual imprisoning him/her to his/her ethnicity as in guilt by association. This perception itself is at the root of all crimes against humanity, which first happens in the mind of the perpetrator who is willing to reduce the multitude of individuals to an identity they are born into without their choice. Yes, the Armenian nation lost its churches, community centers, culture, and language; however, hypothetically speaking, nationless individuals who happened to be Armenians also lost property and lives. In the end, not being able to differentiate between individual and communal rights is tantamount to appropriating the mindset of the perpetrator who is willing to sacrifice the individuality of the person to his/her communal marker. These considerations should not remain as some esoteric philosophical discussion in one corner of a special issue of the Armenian Weekly, since killing the individuality of the weaker is what connects all acts of genocide to each other—anywhere from Namibia to Germany to Rwanda to Bosnia and Darfur. In other words, they not only killed Armenians or Jews per se, but millions of non-identical individuals with distinct rights who had myriads of other identifiers and millions of stories that should not have been reduced to their Armenianness or Jewishness, etc. Especially if one thinks about the official Turkish historiography regarding 1915 and how it is legitimized, one can further understand the problem with guilt by association and, in the case of the protocols, “reward” by association. Accordingly, the Turkish elite had to deport Western Armenians because some Western but mostly Eastern Armenians joined Russian forces against the Ottoman Empire. So Western Armenians were “legitimately” punished because of the actions of the Eastern Armenians.

The protocols bear the rather dangerous seeds of a similar tribalizing of Armenians beyond their control. Perhaps not as visible and not on paper, but nevertheless in the speeches of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the process is marred with the same mistake from the Turkish side, which treats citizens of Azerbaijan and citizens of Turkey as one political unit.

In the case of communal rights, on the other hand, if the majority of Western Armenians are willing to delegate (or with-hold) their communal rights to/from the state of Armenia, then they must do so not through illegal and ex-post facto fait-accomplis, as we saw between Aug. 31 and Oct. 10, 2009, but through a carefully designed legal framework following proper rules of democratic deliberation, if indeed such communal rights can ever be delegated. If anything, these extremely amateurish six weeks were tainted with this and other problems of representation during which all parties touted, first and foremost, for lawlessness in what looked like a badly staged mock deliberation. As one can clearly see by now, being pro- or anti-protocols is not so much the central issue compared to the problem of representation that parties involved should honestly and seriously (I can’t emphasize both enough) think about.

The second problem of representation concerns the jurisdiction of individual diaspora organizations and their representative boundaries. Are political parties, churches, and organizations as distinct as the Armenian General Benevolent Union, the Armenian National Committee of America, the Armenian Assembly of America, and the Knights and Daughters of Vartan entitled to represent the rights of individual Armenians in this particular matter? Where, if anywhere, in their foundational or subsequent documents does it say they can act as councils delegating (withholding) the rights of non-citizen Western Armenian individuals to the state of Armenia? Who gave them the authority to do so? To begin with, there were no large pre-protocols town-hall meetings that engaged all segments of the Armenian communities. Instead of being illegitimate parties to a fait-accompli, these organizations’ first priority should have been to provide and enable a transparent, deliberative environment in which concerned individuals could get non-partisan information (a huge task) about what the protocols are and what kind of representative options they had at hand (they had none at the time, and have none still). And even if they had conducted such meetings, the issue of legitimate representation would still be hanging in the air, since there is no overall framework defining these organizations and parties as representatives of individual Armenians in this particular matter.When and how did Armenians as individuals dele-gate their rights to these organizations and parties? What is the legal basis of their authority other than the calcified structures that the elite everywhere confuse with legitimate representation?

The same thing is true for communal rights, although to a certain extent it’s understandable how the churches can claim representative rights in matters concerning the fate of communal property (such as the churches in Anatolia); even then, there are several issues (different denominations, for example, or the issue of civilian rights in matters concerning communal property) that need to be discussed in a proper framework.

The third problem of representation has to do with how much the elites of these organizations represent their constituencies in any given matter, at any point in time. Apart from the issue of jurisdiction above, the organizations and parties did not follow the rules of deliberation even for their own constituencies. There was a big gap between the reaction of the grassroots of the organizations, and the elites running the organizations. Even if the elite knew better, they still had to justify their decisions to the people they supposedly represent. Instead, they chose to stamp and hijack the process, much like the Amiras and Hodjas of the 18th and 19th century. One way of honoring the dead and the lost, which is at the center of all things Turkish-Armenian, could have been learning from their experience. That experience was the culmination of several centuries of serious thinking and writing about representation.

There was some discussion about the fourth problem of representation, which has to do with the legitimacy of the 2008 presidential elections in Armenia and how representative the Armenian state elite is of its own citizens. This dimension of legitimacy and representation was problematized on and off in the writings and speeches of Raffi Hovhanessian, Vartan Oskanian, Levon Ter Petrossian and, albeit very late (as argued by Henry Dumanian6 ), within some Dashnak quarters as well. Overall, dias-pora organizations were also criticized for not being as interested in the health of the electoral process in Armenia and its outcome as much as they were interested in the protocols. This was a misplaced criticism because the issue of citizenship (elections) is a matter of political choice, whereas the issue of being a survivor is not a political choice. One can choose to become a citizen of Armenia in order to have a say in the politics of Armenia, but individual survivors, regardless of which country’s citizen they are, have a say in any process involving Turkey without necessarily becoming involved in any political process in Armenia. Diaspora organizations’ or individuals’ investment in Armenia does not automatically grant them the right to meddle in Armenia’s domestic affairs unless they also are citizens of Armenia. They, of course, can choose to invest in a direction to enhance the democratization of the institutions in Armenia; how-ever, this is all they can do without a political commitment to a national political order.

The fifth problem of representation has to do with the status of Nagorno-Karabagh and the disputed territories, and the role of Stepanakert in matters that concern its people’s borders, security, and right to self-determination. This is the least clear of all issues of representation, more visible since the Madrid principles. To what extent the “self ” in “self-determination” represents Karabagh’s self, to what extent it is the state of Armenia’s self, is up for debate. The sixth problem of representation concerns the representation of churches other than Apostolic denominations in the process since, historically speaking, they also have a right to be part of any negotiation—something that is often overlooked and forgotten in the process.

The seventh problem of representation has to do with the patriarchal and generally archaic character of Armenian political and benevolent organizations, all of them predominantly governed by heterosexual men. This issue is perhaps not unique to Armenian organizations, and may be prevalent in all traditional settings in which the overwhelming presence of the church as a representative institution makes it all the more difficult for others to be represented equally. However, in an ever-changing and dynamic world, the legitimacy of these organizations will depend more on their ability to embrace all previously underrepresented constituencies instead of clinging to a traditional understanding of patriarchal politics. The eighth problem of representation concerns the Istanbul Armenians since, theoretically speaking, a good number of Armenian churches of Apostolic denomination within the borders of Turkey are under their jurisdiction, and any retributive justice including matters of church and other monuments’ renovation would require their input. In addition to this, who should represent the Istanbul Armenians or whether they should also have a civilian representative body has been a stand-alone divisive issue for the last five years. The current status of Armenian citizens of Turkey is determined by the Lausanne Treaty, which recognizes them as a religious community with the Patriarchate being in charge of matters concerning the community. The problem of Istanbul-Armenians’ representation is further exacerbated by what was supposed to be the election of a co-patriarch. The process has been stalled for almost four and a half months now, while the community awaits the approval of the Ministry of Interior.What should have been an otherwise procedural decision of the Ministry of Interior has been derailed because of the rather arbitrary decision of the co-patriarch election committee to disregard the framework of the 1863 Armenian National Constitution. Even if one party were willing to disregard a legal precedent or a framework partially or totally, that party needs to follow due process rather than hi-jack the discussion with a quasi coup d’état or try to score points with fait-accomplis. It looks like touting for lawlessness has become the current “national” marker of all Diaspora Armenians from the United States to Turkey. This kind of coup d’état mentality, an utter contempt for any due process, and a dangerous penchant for arbitrariness are perhaps the few things the Turkish and Armenian elite can claim brotherhood around, since the Turkish side of the equation is also heavily marred by several domestic faux-pas concerning the procedural aspect of Ergenekon and sub-Ergenekon plots, in addition to a very arbitrary judicial process coupled with an extremely problematic and equally arbitrary process of changing the constitution—a major legal-institutional residue of the 1980 coup d’état.

Perhaps it’s time for all parties to the protocols to better under-stand their at-times common history in the last 100 years of the empire. Although what followed led to the annihilation of Western Armenians from their ancestral territories, those 100 years were also years emblematic of a crucial political process taking issues of representation, legitimacy, and deliberation seriously.


ENDNOTES

* I thank Marc Mamigonian and Aram Arkun for their comments and suggestions.

1. The second thing was the now-defunct Oslo Peace Process which resulted in the Second Intifada; the third was the entire record of the British Mandate in Palestine, particularly its purposefully murky and vague documents, and the imperial institutional design that was also reflected in the linguistic vagueness of the documents themselves.

2. The name of the assembly was not consistent in its Armenian and Ottoman Turkish versions. For example, in the Armenian version it was Azkayin Inthanur Joghov (National General Assembly), which became Meclis-I Umumi (General Assembly without any “national” qualifier) in Ottoman (see Artinian, Vartan, Osmanli Devleti’nde Ermeni Anayasasi’nin Dogusu (Istanbul: Aras Publishing, 2004, p.117); “A Study of the Historical Development of the Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1863” (trans. Zulal Kilic, ed. Rober Koptas)).

3 Yumul, Arus, “Ottoman Empire’s Constitution,” reprinted in Osmanli Devleti’nde Ermeni Anayasasi’nin Dogusu 1839-1863 (ed. Rober Koptas) (Istanbul: Aras Yayincilik, 2004, p. 165).

4. Sassounian, Harut. “Proposal to Create a Framework that Unites Diaspora Armenians,” the Armenian Weekly, Feb. 23, 2010.

5. Dumanian, Henry. “Readers’ Comment on Harout Sassounian’s ‘Proposal to Create a Framework that Unites Diaspora Armenians,’” the Armenian Weekly, Feb. 23, 2010.

6. Dumanian, Henry, “Dumanian to Aprahamian and Yekikian: The Diaspora Should Stop Kidding Itself,” the Armenian Weekly, Jan. 12, 2010.

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3091) Young Turk Mass Violence : A Regime-Focused Approach By Ugur Umit Ungor

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For The Record / The Armenian Weekly, April 2010

This article will discuss the proposition that the Armenian Genocide may be contextualized within a wider vista of mass violence committed against civilians by the Young Turk regime over roughly four decades of rule. It will take as a point of departure the suggestion that a relatively cohesive regime profoundly transformed the multi-ethnic Ottoman society from the 1913 coup d’état to the elections of
. . . 1950. This model will posit the Armenian Genocide within the changing power relations in this period and an exploration of important themes such as leadership, governance, ideology, socialization, and especially mass violence. In the current article, only the latter theme will be developed, using existing theoretical insights from the field of genocide studies and dictatorship studies. 1 The scholarship on the Young Turk regime is developing rapidly. So far, the regime has been studied in a fragmented way, with focus on specific aspects rather than its coherence. This article will attempt to challenge the convention by suggesting a new interpretative framework for understanding the regime. The value of this approach is that it can develop the thesis that from 1913–50, a clear political continuity can be observed in the administrative and ideological development of that dictatorship.

Models of dictatorships and totalitarianism need to identify areas in need of clarification, problematize major issues, and conjure up relevant research questions. For the Young Turk case, we have to ask several of these: How can the Young Turk dictator-ship best be understood? What are the most relevant and pertinent set of research questions to ask? And in which directions should the scholarship develop in order to generate the most meaningful and fruitful results? Theoretical views on the nature of dictatorships developed in totalitarianism studies have yielded important insights and tools that can be used for shedding light on the rise and fall of the Young Turk dictator-ship. In what follows, I will first outline several relevant facets of the regime itself, and then move on to discuss the issue of mass violence in more detail.

THE YOUNG TURK
DICTATORSHIP

What is the Young Turk dictatorship? Any discussion on the nature of the Young Turk regime needs to commence with its leader-ship, the political elite at the apex of the regime’s political and military power. There are at least three ways of viewing this theme: periodization, biography, and authority.

The first issue, periodization, remains a thorny issue in modern Turkish history. The conventional model of modern Ottoman/Turkish history holds that there are two distinct regimes at work in the first half of the 20th century. The Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, or CUP) ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1913–18. Subsequently, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi/Partisi, or RPP) was in power of the Turkish Republic between 1923 and 1950. In this view, the War of Independence of 1919–22 segregates these two regimes as a new regime came into being. The abolition of the sultanate and promulgation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 then marks the distinction through a clear legal discontinuity. These distinctions focus mainly on cosmetic problems such as labels and denominations, rather than on core issues such as regime structure, staffing, political culture, ideology, and pol-icy. This chronological model is heavily influenced, if not produced entirely, by Young Turk historiography. 2

In order to survive in an international force field that was opposed to them, it was in the Young Turks’ interest to present the post-1918 regime as an entirely novel political movement. This dissociation was necessary since the CUP elite was indicted for war crimes and genocide. On the surface, the CUP dissolved itself in 1918, but in reality it only changed its name and appearance: The name of the political party, the party organ, and key security forces were changed after 1918. Upstart Young Turks then perpetuated and codified this myth. For example, in his famous 1927 speech “Nutuk,” Kemal Ataturk misrepresented the historical record by aggrandizing his role in the Young Turk movement and airbrushing the fact that the CUP resurrected itself after 1918 and launched him to lead the movement. 3 The Young Turk historical gaze became the official ideology of the Turkish Republic and has contaminated modern scholarship as well: The trap of “methodological Kemalism” is one of the most common pitfalls that surround scholarship on the Young Turk era. Historians, speciously, have tended to periodize either from 1923 on, or up to 1923. Rather, we should view the period 1913–50 as a more circumscribed, coherent period.

Second, biographies can concretize the abstract notion of the continuity of Young Turk rule. It can be suggested that a generation of men, born roughly between 1870 and 1890 and educated under Sultan Abdul Hamid II at the medical and military academies, and the school for civil service, would ultimately become the Young Turk generation. United in the Young Turk movement, baptized in the fire of Balkan paramilitarism, they struggled for power around the fin de si` ecle and rose to hegemony in the first half of the 20th century. The biographies of the Young Turks are relevant for understanding their ethnic and class backgrounds, and educational and political experiences. 4 A solid understanding of individual and collective biographies can also explain the emergence of their belief system.

To support the claim of continuity in biographical terms, it is sufficient to cross-reference CUP members with RPP members and accentuate the emerging strong overlap in the composi-tion and structure of the minis-terial elites. It is no coincidence that names such as Mahmud Celal Bayar, Tevfik Rustu Aras, Mustafa Abdulhalik Renda, Kazim Ozalp, Ibrahim Tali Ongoren, Hilmi Uran, Ali Cenani, Sukru Kaya, and others appear throughout the 1913–50 era in official reports and operative documents as architects of state formation and nation building. The same continuity applies to the Turkish military. 5 After the ostensible caesura of 1923, these were the men who were employed since they had proved their loyalty to the CUP’s ideological projects and were intimately related to each other— in generation, kinship, and experience of war and revolution. Even though some men were tried and hanged in 1926, innumerable Young Turks in mid-level positions remained in office.

The third issue, authority, is a stumbling block in the study of the Young Turk dictatorship. The political elite that made up the movement and the party largely consisted of the same group of officers and professionals. As we know, the top elite in charge of the regime changed. For the first phase of the regime, the government was led by Mehmed Talaat as interior minister (later “grand vizier”), Ismail Enver (minister of war), and Ahmed Cemal (minister of navy, viceroy of Syria). This regime has often been called the “triumvirate,” but this is misleading: Cemal Pasha was sidetracked at the beginning of the war (and later tried to negotiate a separate agreement with the Allies), and the relationship between Talaat and Enver still awaits thorough investigation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that rather than cooperation, the relationship was marked by intrigue, competition, and occasionally even threatening enmity at the nexus of the respective ministries they wielded power over: the Interior Ministry and the War Ministry, respectively. 6

The second Young Turk regime had a less multipolar structure, as authority revolved more around the personal dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, aided by significant henchmen. 7 Not one of the triumvirate survived to see the Turkish Republic, but the political culture did not experience major changes. A major challenge in the scholarship is to come to grips with the (dis)continuities and change in this process, as well as with the nature of authoritarian rule and charismatic leader-ship. For example, fragmentation remains an issue to be investigated: The Young Turk dictatorship was no monolithic moloch in perfect inner harmony. There was considerable power struggle, rivalry, and intrigue within both phases and between regions, security forces, and administrative units. But there was also consensus on the nation-state ideology. More research is needed into these fields.

The nature of the Young Turk regime is a serious controversy in Turkish history, and opinions on it differ radically. Influential myths uphold the metahistorical idea that Ataturk established democracy in Turkey, and that the post-war Young Turk regime was a modern parliamentarian democracy. Western countries have traditionally assessed the Young Turk regime in a positive light, as a buffer against Communism and an engine for reform against “reactionary” political Islam. 8 Hans Kohn, for example, argued in 1939 that the Kemalist dictatorship “is based upon liberal principles, upon the ideas of progress of the nineteenth century. . . . Liberalism and democracy are not despised or scorned, they are the goal of education.”9 Some historians, too, apologetically reject the positing of the Young Turk regime as a totalitarian dictatorship imbued with a radically nationalist ideology, similar to a more general inter-war European phenomenon. For example, Zafer Toprak has claimed that the Young Turks had no plans to demographically homogenize the Ottoman Empire through force. 10 In the face of the sophisticated body of research on Young Turk population politics, this is a hardly tenable position. Feroz Ahmad writes about the Young Turk rejection of democracy that “given the prevailing internal and external circumstances during these years, it would be rash to expect such a regime.”11 This too, is a justificatory assertion that aims to exonerate and exculpate the regime, e.g. from its agency in the mass crimes committed between 1913 and 1950.

Critical thinkers have dismissed these justifications as myths. Erik-Jan Zurcher, for example, writes that the Young Turk party had “totalitarian tendencies,” and continues to argue that what made it totalitarian was “the extreme nationalism, with its attendant development of a legitimizing historical mythology and racist rhetoric, the authoritarian character of the regime and its efforts to establish a complete totalitarian monopoly for its party of the political, social and cultural scene, the personality cult that developed around… Ataturk and Inonu…and the emphasis on national unity and solidarity with its attendant denial of class conflicts.”12 (To this might be added the violent treatment of ethnic minorities.) Hans-Lukas Kieser, too, summarily dismisses the myth that the Young Turk leadership was naive, benevolent, and relatively powerless in the face of overwhelming circumstances. 13 Considering the Young Turk regime’s monist urge to gain mastery over social processes and human destinies, its ambition to monopolize power at the center, destroy or silence opposition, commit mass violence against its own citizens, develop a radical ideology and a personality cult around a single leader, and extinguish non-Turkish cultural life in the public sphere of the eastern provinces, the regime perhaps may be classified as a nationalist, violent, totalitarian dictatorship.

MASS VIOLENCE

These insights need to be developed and related to discussions on the regime’s ideas and acts of violence. As Jacques Sémelin has argued, mass violence is never a spontaneous outburst of popular emotion, nor a chaotic swarm of individuals milling about. It is fundamentally a coordinated effort organized by the very top political elite, aided and carried out by the perpetrating agencies. 14

In other words, to understand mass violence we have to understand better the workings of the political elite, the cogs of the dictatorial regime that pursued the destruction policies.

First and foremost, it is important to note that the Young Turk regime was responsible for unprecedented levels of political violence in modern Ottoman-Turkish society. Never before and never after have so many people been involved in processes of mass violence, either as perpetrators or as victims. The Young Turks were politically and ideologically committed to violence. 15 Four decades ago, Feroz Ahmad already argued:

Another facet of the political revolution was the brutalization of political life. Once politics ceased to be the sport of the ruling classes the rules were changed accordingly. Under Abdulhamid death sentences were the exception not the rule. Dissent was made impotent through isolation and dissenters in exile could always recant....The Unionists were men of a different stamp. To them politics was much more than a game and having seized power they meant to hold on to it. To do so they were willing to use all possible means, so that repression and violence became the order of the day. Nothing was sacred in the pursuit of power and those guilty of dis-sent must be prepared to pay with their lives. 16

The polarization and depacification of Ottoman political culture and society was profound. During the Young Turk era (1913–50), we can distinguish at least two major processes of state violence: the persecution and murder of Armenians and Syriacs in 1915, and the persecution and deportation of Kurds in the 1920’s and 1930’s. There are fundamental similarities and differences in these two episodes of Young Turk mass violence, but suffice it to mention that for our purposes we will focus on continuities. This section will dis-cuss the Young Turks’ experience with mass violence as it developed in the four decades the regime dominated Ottoman-Turkish politics. It will argue that the Young Turk movement was forged in an imperial apocalypse of war and ethnic cleansing that profoundly affected their political outlook once they seized power. From then on, the regime orchestrated several large-scale processes of violent persecution and mass murder of Armenians, Greeks, Kurds and others. Understanding the roots and rationale of all this violence remains an important challenge, which is beyond the scope of this article.

The Young Turk Movement Was Forged In An Imperial Apocalypse Of War And Ethnic Cleansing That Profoundly Affected Their Political Outlook Once They Seized Power.

For our purposes, we can discern at least three schools of thought on the Armenian Genocide, although the term “school” should be used relatively loosely. A first (and early) avenue of investigation was pursued by scholars who contextualized the long-term Armenian experience, in particular the persecutions and massacres against Ottoman Armenians during the crisis from the 1890’s to the 1915 genocide. In this interpretation, the Armenian call for equality, a functioning rule of law, harmony, autonomy, or independence was met by successive Ottoman governments with violence and repression. The genocide was a culmination that ended the “Armenian Question” by ending the Armenian demographic presence in the empire. 17

A second school contextualized the Armenian experience in World War I with that of other groups. They argued that the Young Turk regime from 1914 on engaged in a full-fledged policy of demo-graphic “Turkification” involving deportations of entire groups, including Armenians, Kurds, Circassians, Greeks, and others. The objective in this massive project was demo-graphic “Turkification”: the numerical dilution of these groups in certain territories, to be repopulated with Turks. The destruction of Armenians was an ouverture, as well as major component, of this process. 18 A third line of thought has contextualized the violence in the Turkish nation formation process in the long 19th century, during which the definition and demarcation of the nation under severe inter-state and intra-state pressures frequently led to crises of identity. During these crises, external enemies such as the Russian Empire were equated with internal ones, such as the Armenian middle classes in the Ottoman cities.19


It might be worthwhile to launch a fourth approach that may shed light on Young Turk mass violence from a different perspective. I argue, as an alternative or complementary approach to these three perspectives, for a historical contextualization that is regime-focused: I believe it can be helpful to apply Zurcher’s periodization of 1913–50 as the “Young Turk era” to the study of mass violence in that wretched period. Whereas Zurcher demonstrated political and administrative continuities in terms of state formation, I will conceptualize the problem from the perspective of mass violence. The problem appears to us when we consider the following timeline of intra-society state violence under the Young Turks. First of all, the very ascendance to power of the Young Turk party in 1913 is marked by the bloody coup d’état, the installation of a dictatorship, and the silencing and destruction of the opposition. Nineteen fifteen saw the genocide of Armenians and Syriacs, and 1921 the massacres of Pontic Greeks and Kurdish Alevis of Kocgiri. Only a few years later, the 1925 conflict and ensuing massacres in the Diyarbakir region destroyed innumerable lives, villages, and property. That episode was only matched by the 1930 massacres in the Ararat region, which included the first systematic Young Turk efforts of aerial bombing. The most serious inter-war massacre was the 1938 one in the Dersim region following a brief guerrilla war with the local Kurdish Alevi resistance. 20 All of this violence was committed by the Young Turk political elite.

For the victim groups it seemed as if they were singularly victimized in these episodes, and many authors have studied these episodes in isolation. Although we need to know much more about each disparate event, the disadvantages of this approach are that they are not related to each other historically or conceptually. The Armenian Genocide is no exception to this: As in many cases of genocide, the first studies were conducted by surviving intellectuals. However, lifting out the genocide from the broader context offered here may run the risk of decontextualizing it from four decades of Young Turk mass violence. For this, we need comparative studies of each disparate event: How do the deportations of 1915–16 compare to those of 1925 and 1934? Also, what can we learn about the perpetrators who were involved in all these events from 1915–38? Finally, what was the influence of earlier episodes of state violence on later phases?

It might be instructive to draw a parallel with the Stalinist dictatorship. Research into Soviet mass violence has yielded important results in terms of the forms and nature of violence that Stalin(ism) produced. Across Stalin’s bloody rule, several important campaigns of mass violence were launched: the deportation and murder of the country’s rural middle class during “dekulakization” in the late 1920’s, the Great Terror campaign of political repression and persecution orchestrated in 1937–38, the mass murder of Polish military officers in 1940, and the destructive comprehensive deportation of many ethnic groups (Poles, Chechens,Germans, Koreans, Crimean Tatars). The same political elite targeted millions of people based on their sup-posed group identity over a period of two decades. 21

With this series of massacres in mind, singling out the Great Terror of 1937–38 as if it had no relation with the other violent episodes obfuscates the overall nature of the regime. In the field of Armenian Genocide studies, the murder of Armenians is studied in relative isolation from the wider context of Young Turk mass violence. This hiatus in the scholarship is puzzling, considering only a few years separates episodes of Young Turk mass murder, such as the 1915 genocide of Armenians and the 1925 massacres and deportations of Kurds. In some areas, like Diyarbakir, the same local elites who had destroyed the Armenian presence were also instrumental in the massacre and deportation of Kurds. As in the case of the Stalinist dictatorship, the genesis of a violent episode depended on a myriad of factors related to the international pressures of the threat of war, the political tensions existing within the system, and the bipolar dynamic between minority and state. For each of these cases,more con-textual research could clarify how it fits in with the regime’s utopian ideology or particular political objectives.

Here is one example that must stand for many. The embodiment of continuity in Young Turk mass violence might well be the bureaucrat Sukru Kaya (1883–1959). His involvement with the Young Turk movement and regime ranges from school teacher to civil servant to wartime director of the deportation apparatus, up to minister of culture and interior minister. 22

Sukru Kaya was born on the Aegean island of Kos into a middle-class family. He enrolled in the Galatasaray Lycée, graduated from law school in 1908, and moved to Paris to continue his graduate studies. Upon his return to the Ottoman Empire, he began working for the state, first as a clerk for the Foreign Ministry and later as a civil inspector. The Young Turk seizure of power offered him an opportunity to progress within the Ottoman state bureaucracy. In June 1915, Kaya was assigned the task of opening new state orphanages to house Armenian children younger than 10. 23

An efficient organizer, he won the favor of Talaat and was made director of the bureaucratic apparatus in charge of the deportation process, the Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants (Iskan-i Asair ve Muhacirin Muduriyeti,or IAMM).During his tenure, Kaya was the key executive responsible for the destruction of Ottoman Armenians. He traveled into the field, in particular Diyarbakir and Aleppo, and supervised the construction of concentration camps along the Euphrates. In 1918, the British arrested and imprisoned Kaya at Malta, along with other Young Turks who were accused of crimes. He escaped from Malta and stayed in Italy and Germany for a while, before he returned to Anatolia and joined the Young Turk movement in Ankara. In 1923 he worked as a consultant to the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference. 24

Under the Turkish Republic, Kaya was made mayor of Izmir, member of parliament for Mugla, and minister of agriculture. Ultimately, he found his calling under Kemal Ataturk and functioned as interior minister between 1927 and 1938. During that period, Kaya was responsible for the implementation of the persecution and deportation of Kurds. Kaya was an ideologue: In his speeches, some of which have been published, he’d explain the need “to separate the country into west and east,” arguing that in the east, it was the government’s task to “render the Turk the master.”25 This effectively meant the launching of a nation-state project whereby non-Turks would be expelled and deported from the eastern provinces, and Turks settled on the confiscated land. To determine the criteria for the identification and selection of the deportees, Kaya pushed for the use of the term “race” (irk). 26 He saw violence against ethnic minority civilians as a legitimate solution of national security dilemmas. For example, after the 1925 campaign against Kurds, he concluded that government forces had “crushed and annihilated the rebels and bandits in the east . . . like all our other measures, this is a public expression of force. Whatever it costs for the strength of the Turkish state.”27

Again, Kaya traveled into the field for several important research trips and reported directly to his superior, Kemal Ataturk. During a 1931 journey, he was enraged by the fact that former Armenian deportees in Syria were continuing their crafts and trades, and moving across the Turkish-Syrian border to conduct business in eastern Turkey. They were working with Arabs, Kurds, and Turks, some of whom were friends, neighbors, or even old business partners. As this thwarted the development of the Turkish “national economy,” he proposed a boycott against anyone working with Armenians and tighter surveillance, including building a hermetic border. 28

Kaya also oversaw the 1938 campaign in the Dersim region, in which at least 40,000 Kurdish Alevis were murdered and a further 15,000 deported in cattle wagons to be dispersed in western Anatolian villages. Some scholars have suggested that these high levels of violence were generated by Young Turk resentment against the Dersim Kurds for sheltering and rescuing considerable numbers of Armenians during the genocide. 29

The vindication of this nationalist violence was virtually identical to the same discourse that had justified genocide two decades before. Sukru Kaya’s biography suggests an inescapable diachronic link between episodes of Young Turk mass violence that may seem unrelated and disparate at the surface, but demonstrate thorough-going biographical, institutional, and ideological links. His profile epitomizes the ebb and flow of a generation of young, ambitious, and ruthless bureaucrats committed to an inherently violent ideology.


DISCUSSION

Drawing together the threads of this argument, three types of continuities need to be suggested. First, regime continuity. There can be little doubt that the Committee of Union and Progress morphed into the Republican People’s Party. But we need to understand better the precise administrative, political, and military continuities in this process. Secondly, in most administrative sectors there is a strong elite continuity, which can be demonstrated easily, for example, for men such as Sukru Kaya. Young Turk henchmen kept their power bases intact and were mobilized during periods of crisis and ideological politics to draw upon prior experience. Ideological continuity, then, is the third form of continuity. This in particular is exemplified in the nation-state ideology and in approaches to territoriality: From 1913–50, eastern Turkey was seen as a con-tested territory to be purified of large minorities such as Armenians and Kurds.We need to understand these continuities better—administrative, biographical, military, ideological, at the national and local levels. A sociological understanding of this violence must demonstrate the intersection between individual biographical experience, social structural changes, historical forces, developments, and events in the political process.


ENDNOTES

1. A much more expanded version of this argument will follow in a forthcoming interpretative volume: Ugur Umit Ungor, The Young Turk Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

2. Busra Ersanli, Iktidar ve Tarih: Turkiye’de ‘Resmi Tarih’ Tezinin Olusumu (1929–1937) (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2003); Etienne Copeaux, Espaces et temps de la nation turque: analyse d’une historiographie nationaliste 1931–1993 (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1997), pp. 190–96.

3. Hulya Adak, “National Myths and Self-Na(rra)tions: Mustafa Kemal’s ‘Nutuk’ and Halide Edib’s ‘Memoirs’ and ‘The Turkish Ordeal,’” in South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 102, no. 2/3 (2003), pp. 509–27.

4. For a generational analysis, see Erik-Jan Zurcher, “How Europeans adopted Anatolia and created Turkey,” in European Review, vol. 13, no. 3 (2005), pp. 379–94.

5. Dankwart A. Rustow, “The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic,” in World Politics, vol. 11 (1959), pp. 513–52.

6. Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya Enver Pasa (Istanbul: Remzi, 1972), vol. 2 (1908–14), p. 418.

7. Theories on charismatic leadership could shed further light on the construction and functions of the Ataturk myth. For a brief discussion on Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as a dictator, see Frank J. Coppa (ed.), Encyclopedia of Modern Dictators: From Napoleon to the Present (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 129–30.

8. Donald Bloxham, “Changing Perceptions of State Violence: Turkey’s ‘Westward’ Development through Anglo-Saxon Eyes,” in Richard Littlejohns and Sara Soncini (eds.), Myths of Europe (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), pp. 223–34.

9. Hans Kohn, Revolutions and Dictatorships: Essays in Contemporary History (Cam-bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939), pp. 255.

10. Zafer Toprak, “Bir Hayal Urunu: ‘Ittihatcilarin Turklestirme Politikasi,’” in Toplumsal Tarih, vol. 146 (2006), pp. 14–22; Interview with Zafer Toprak, Taraf, Nov. 10, 2008.

11. Feroz Ahmad, From Empire to Republic: Essays on the Late Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), vol. 1, p. 174.

12. Erik-Jan Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 186.

13. Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Modernisierung und Gewalt in der Grundungsepoche des turkischen Nationalstaats (1913–1938),” in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, vol. 57, no. 3 (2006), pp. 156–67.

14. Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (London: Hurst & Co., 2007), p. 141.

15. George W. Gawrych, “The Culture and Politics of Violence in Turkish society, 1903–14,” in Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 22, no. 3 (1986), pp. 307–30.

16. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 163.

17. Among the many different studies, see Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia into the Caucasus (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1995).

18. For a recent state-of-the-art collection of articles, see Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 10, no. 4 (2008), special issue on “Late Ottoman Genocides”; Fuat Dundar,Modern Turkiye’nin Sifresi: Ittihat ve Terakki’nin Etnisite Muhendisligi (1913–1918) (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2008).

19. Taner Akcam, Turk Ulusal Kimligi ve Ermeni Sorunu (Istanbul: Su, 2001).

20. Hans-Lukas Kieser, Der verpasste Friede: Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Turkei 1839–1938 (Zurich: Chronos, 2000).

21. For a recent state-of-the-art collection of articles, see Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 11, no. 2–3 (2009), special issue on “New Perspectives on Soviet Mass Violence.”

22. Interior Ministry Archive (Ankara), personnel file of Sukru Kaya, document no. 1041, p. 21.

23. BOA, DH.SFR 54/150, Ministry of Education to provinces, June 26, 1915.

24. Hakki Uyar’s “Sukru Kaya” in Modern Turkiye’de Siyasi Dusunce (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2001), pp. 80–91, focuses exclu-sively on the political and ideological back-ground of Kaya and ignores his violent career.

25. Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi Zabit Ceridesi, vol. 23, period 4, session 3 (June 14, 1934), p. 139.

26. ibid., p. 145.

27. Ekrem Erguven (ed.), Sukru Kaya: Sozleri-Yazilari 1927–1937 (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1937), pp. 7–8.

28. Basbakanlik Cumhuriyet Arsivi (Turkish Republican Archives, Ankara), 030.10/180.244.6, Interior Minister Sukru Kaya to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, Dec. 5, 1931.

29. Martin van Bruinessen, “Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937–38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988),” in George J. Andreopoulos (ed.), Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 141–70.

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