Wednesday, January 23, 2013
3390) What Is Genocide? The Armenian Case: Are The Ottomans Guilty Of Ethnic Cleansing Or A Crime Against Humanity?
by Gunter, Michael M,*
* Michael M. Gunter, professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University,
was senior Fulbright lecturer at the Middle East Technical University in Turkey.
Middle East Quarterly; Winter2013, Vol. 20 Issue 1, p37-46, 10p
Subject Terms:
-HISTORY
-ARMENIAN massacres, 1915-1923
-DEFINITIONS
-GENOCIDE
-WORLD War, 1914-1918 -- Atrocities
-OTTOMAN Empire, 1288-1918
Abstract: The article discusses genocide in the context of the United Nations Genocide Convention's definition of the term after World War II and concludes it is reasonable to question the validity of calling the Armenian tragedy which occurred in 1915 in the Ottoman Empire genocide. The Young Turks regime's intent or premeditation to massacre all Armenians in Turkey is questioned. A discussion is supported with research showing that Armenians in the Armenian Revolutionary Federation resisted the Ottoman regime and were considered a threat to national security. The research includes Armenian state prime minster Hovhannes Katchaznouni's comments in a speech and books on this topic by Kapriel Serope Papazian and Guenter Lewy
The liberal use of the term "genocide" has stirred numerous controversies and debates. Despite an international law definition, the word has been applied in some questionable instances. The deliberate murder of more than a million Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge, some of whose victims are pictured here, was undoubtedly a horrific crime, but does it fit the definition of genocide?
. . .
Turkey, Past and Future
Shortly after the World War II, genocide was legally defined by the U.N. Genocide Convention as "any… acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."1 The key word from the perspective of this article is "intent." For while nobody can deny the disaster wrought on the Armenians by the 1915 deportations and massacres, the question is whether or not it can be defined as genocide--arguably the most heinous crime imaginable.
THE AMBIGUITY OF GENOCIDE
The strict international law definition of genocide has not prevented its application to virtually every conflict involving a large number of civilian deaths from the Athenian massacre of the inhabitants of Milos in 416 B.C.E., to the Mongol sacking of Baghdad in 1258, to the fate of the native North American Indians, to Stalin's induced famine in the Ukraine in the early 1930s, to the recent conflicts in Bosnia, Burundi, Chechnya, Colombia, Guatemala, Iraq, Sudan, and Rwanda, which is not to deny that some of these cases do indeed qualify as genocide.
The liberal use of the term has naturally stirred numerous controversies and debates. Israel Charny offers little help by arguing that any massacre constitutes genocide, even the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear meltdown.2 At the other end of the spectrum, Stephen Katz views the Holocaust as the only true genocide in history.3 In between these two polar definitions, Ton Zwaan has attempted to distinguish between "total" and "complete" genocide and "partial" genocides.4
Even the U.N. definition suffers from some ambiguities owing to being a compromise among all signatories. Thus, the convention legally protects only "national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups," not those defined politically, economically, or culturally, giving rise to varying interpretations of its intentions. For example, while the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia convicted seven Bosnian Serbs of genocide for their role in the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre of some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims,5 the International Court of Justice, in its judgment in Bosnia vs. Serbia, focused on Serbia's "intent" rather than "outcome" regarding the murder of Bosnian Muslims, absolving it of the charge of genocide.6 Clearly, these contradictory decisions have added to the confusion of what genocide legally constitutes.
Likewise, the debate whether the Darfur events constituted genocide continues apace. U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell characterized Darfur as a case of genocide based on a U.S. government-funded study, which had surveyed 1,136 Darfur refugees in neighboring Chad.7 By contrast, a study commissioned by U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan concluded that while the Darfur events should be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, they did not amount to genocide.8 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also declined to characterize the violence in Darfur as genocide while the Arab League and the African Union took a similar position, emphasizing instead the civil war aspect of the conflict. For their part EU, British, Canadian, and Chinese officials, among others, have shied away from calling it genocide. Samantha Power, the author of a Pulitzer Prize winning study on genocide, favored the term ethnic cleansing to describe what was occurring.9
When in July 2008, ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo accused Sudanese president Omar Bashir of genocide and asked the court to issue an arrest warrant, many in the Arab League and the African Union criticized the genocide charge as biased against their region.10 It remains to be seen how wise the ICC has been in bringing genocide charges in this case. Clearly, there was a lack of agreement on what did or did not constitute genocide in Darfur. Such a situation illustrates the ambiguity surrounding the concept of genocide.
In an attempt to alleviate these problems, scholars have offered such additional detailed concepts as "politicide" to refer to mass murders of a political nature, "democide" to describe government-perpetrated mass murders of at least one million people, ethnocide, Judeocide, ecocide, feminicide, libricide (for the destruction of libraries), urbicide, elitocide, linguicide, and culturicide, among others.11 In addition we now have such concepts as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.
Why this semantic disarray? Henry Huttenbach has argued, "Too often has the accusation of genocide been made simply for the emotional effect or to make a political point, with the result that more and more events have been claimed to be genocide to the point that the term has lost its original meaning."12 Jacques Semelin has similarly explained: "Whether use of the word 'genocide' is justified or not, the term aims to strike our imagination, awaken our moral conscience and mobilise public opinion on behalf of the victims." He adds: "Under these circumstances, anyone daring to suggest that what is going on is not 'really' genocide is immediately accused of weakness or sympathizing with the aggressors." Thus,
The term genocide can be used as a propaganda tool by becoming the hinge for a venomous rhetoric against a sworn enemy. Given the powerful emotional charge the word genocide generates, it can be used and re-used in all sorts of hate talk to heap international opprobrium on whoever is accused of genocidal intent. … The obvious conclusion: The word is used as much as a symbolic shield to claim victim status for one's people, as a sword raised against one's deadly enemy.13
Intent or premeditation is all important in defining genocide "because it removes from consideration not only natural disasters but also those man-made disasters that took place without explicit planning. Many of the epidemics of communicable diseases that reached genocidal proportions, for example were caused by unwitting human actions."14 Although some would disagree, the fate of the North American indigenous people is a case in point as they died largely from disease, not intent. Therefore, a large loss of life is not in itself proof of genocide. Ignoring intent creates a distorted scenario and may lead to incorrect conclusions as to what really occurred.
THE ARMENIANS
What then of the Armenian case? Unfortunately, as the well-known journalist and scholar Gwynne Dyer concluded more than thirty-five years ago, most Turkish and Armenian scholars are unable to be objective on this issue resulting in a situation of "Turkish falsifiers and Armenian deceivers."15
The main purpose of this discussion, therefore, is not to deny that Turks killed and expelled Armenians on a large scale; indeed what happened might in today's vocabulary be called war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or even crimes against humanity. To prove genocide, however, intent or premeditation must be demonstrated, and in the Armenian case it has not. It must also be borne in mind that what occurred was not a unilateral Turkish action but part of a long-term process in which some Armenians were guilty of killing as many Turks as they could in their attempt to rebel.
Christopher de Ballaigue argues that "what is needed is a vaguer designation for the events of 1915, avoiding the G-word but clearly connoting criminal acts of slaughter, to which reasonable scholars can subscribe."16
Arnold Toynbee, the renowned historian who coedited the Blue Book compilation of Turkish atrocities during World War I,17 later wrote:
"In the redistribution of Near and Middle Eastern Territories, the atrocities which have accompanied it from the beginning have been revealed in their true light, as crimes incidental to an abnormal process, which all parties have committed in turn, and not as the peculiar practice of one denomination or nationality."18 Indeed, in his final statement on the subject, Toynbee declared: "Armenian political aspirations had not been legitimate. … Their aspirations did not merely threaten to break up the Turkish Empire; they could not be fulfilled without doing grave injustice to the Turkish people itself."19 In addition, Adm. Mark Bristol, U.S. high commissioner and then-ambassador to Turkey after World War I, wrote in a long cable to the State Department in 1920: "While the Turks were all that people said they were, the other side of the coin was obscured by the flood of Greek and Armenian propaganda painting the Turks as completely inhuman and undeserving of any consideration while suppressing all facts in favor of the Turks and against the minorities."20
More recently, Edward J. Erickson, a military historian, concluded after a careful examination: "Nothing can justify the massacres of the Armenians nor can a case be made that the entire Armenian population of the six Anatolian provinces was an active and hostile threat to Ottoman national security." This said, Erickson added: "However, a case can be made that the Ottomans judged the Armenians to be a great threat to the 3rd and 4th [Ottoman] Armies and that genuine intelligence and security concerns drove that decision. It may also be stated that the Ottoman reaction was escalatory and responsive rather than premeditated and pre-planned."21
On the other hand, Taner Akcam, a Turkish sociologist who has prominently broken with his country's official narrative, concluded after compiling weighty evidence that the "Ottoman authorities' genocidal intent becomes clear."22 This conclusion was challenged by Turkish researcher Erman Sahin who accused Akcam of "dishonesty--which manifests itself in the form of numerous deliberate alterations and distortions, misleading quotations and doctoring of data-casts doubt on the accuracy of his claims as well as his conclusions."23 In a later critique of Akçam's subsequent work, Sahin concluded: "These are substantive matters that raise serious concerns as to the author's theses, which appear to be based on a selective and distorted presentation of Ottoman archival materials and other sources. … Such errors seriously undermine the author's and the book's credibility."24
More recently, Akcam claimed that despite Turkish attempts to "hide the evidence" through systematic "loss" and destruction of documents, his new work in the Ottoman archives "clearly points in the direction of a deliberate Ottoman government policy to annihilate its Armenian population."25 Maybe, but maybe not. Equally likely is that any destruction of documents at the end of World War I was simply designed to protect military secrets from falling into enemy hands, something any government would want to do. More to the point, Akcam also states that "the clearest statement that the aim of the [Ottoman] government's policies toward the Armenians was annihilation is found in a cable of 29 August 1915 from interior minister Talat Pasha" in which he asserted that the "Armenian question in the eastern provinces has been resolved. … There's no need to sully the nation and the government's honor] with further atrocities."26 This document, however, does not prove genocidal intent except to those determined to find it. Rather, Talat's statement might simply mean precisely what it states: The Armenian deportations, although resulting in many atrocities and deaths, have solved the issue.
In a carefully nuanced study, historian Donald Bloxham concluded that what happened was premeditated and therefore genocide.27 Though stating in an earlier article "that there was no a priori blueprint for genocide, and that it emerged from a series of more limited regional measures in a process of cumulative policy radicalization,"28 he, nevertheless, used the term genocide because of the magnitude of what happened and because "nowhere else during the First World War was revolutionary nationalism answered with total murder. That is the crux of the issue."29 At the same time, he wondered "whether recognition [of genocide] is really going to open the door to healing wounds and reconciliation, as we are often told, or whether it is a means of redressing nationalist grievances. Is it an issue of historical truth, morality and responsibility, or of unresolved political and material claims?"30
Finally, it should be noted that the Armenian claims of genocide are encumbered by intrinsic legal and philosophical problems. This is due to the fact that any finding under international law of genocide in the Armenian case at this late date would constitute a legally untenable ex-post-facto proclamation, namely: Make a crime of an action which, when originally committed, was not a crime. The concept of genocide did not even exist until it was formulated during World War II by Raphael Lemkin, while the genocide convention only entered into force in 1951.
THE MANIFESTO OF HOVHANNES KATCHAZNOUNI
Hovhannes Katchaznouni was the first prime minister (1918-19) of the short-lived Armenian state following World War I. It is useful to turn to his April 1923 address to the Armenian revolutionary and nationalist Dashnak party congress, held in the Romanian capital of Bucharest. While not gainsaying "this unspeakable crime … the deportations and mass exiles and massacres which took place during the Summer and Autumn of 1915,"31 Katchaznouni's speech constitutes a remarkable self-criticism by a top Armenian leader. No wonder that many Armenians have done their best to remove this telling document from libraries around the world. It is, therefore, useful to cite what Katchaznouni had to say at some length:
In the Fall of 1914, Armenian volunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks because they could not refrain themselves from fighting. This was an inevitable result of psychology on which the Armenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation. … It is important to register only the evidence that we did participate in that volunteer movement to the largest extent. …
We had embraced Russia wholeheartedly without any compunction. Without any positive basis of fact, we believed that the Tsarist government would grant us a more or less broad self-government in the Caucasus and in the Armenian vilayets liberated from Turkey as a reward for our loyalty, our efforts, and assistance.
We overestimated the ability of the Armenian people, its political and military power, and overestimated the extent and importance of the services our people rendered to the Russians. And by overestimating our very modest worth and merit was where we naturally exaggerated our hopes and expectations. …
The proof is, however--and this is essential--that the struggle began decades ago against the Turkish government [which] brought about the deportation or extermination of the Armenian people in Turkey and the desolation of Turkish Armenia. This was the terrible fact!32
K.S. PAPAZIAN'S PATRIOTISM PERVERTED
A decade after the publication of Katchaznouni's speech, but still much closer to the events of World War I than now, Kapriel Serope Papazian produced a most revealing critique of the Dashnaks' perfidy, terrorism, and disastrous policies that had helped lead to the events in question. Written by an Armenian who bore no love for the Turks, but hushed up, ignored, and virtually forgotten by many because its self-critical revelations do not mesh with the received Armenian thesis of innocent victimization, Papazian's analysis33 calls for close scrutiny.
Authored just after the notorious Dashnak murder of Armenian archbishop Leon Tourian in New York City on Christmas Eve 1933,34 Papazian began by expressing disdain for the group's "predatory inclinations" before examining the "terrorism in the Dashnaks' early [1892] program," which sought "to fight, and to subject to terrorism the government officials, the traitors, the betrayers, the usurers, and the exploiters of all description." Having analyzed the movement's ideological and operational history, Papazian explored what actually transpired during World War I:
The fact remains, however, that the leaders of the Turkish-Armenian section of the Dashnagtzoutune did not carry out their promise of loyalty to the Turkish cause when the Turks entered the war. … Prudence was thrown to the winds … and a call was sent for Armenian volunteers to fight the Turks on the Caucasian front.
Thousands of Armenians from all over the world flocked to the standards of such famous fighters as Antranik, Kery, Dro, etc. The Armenian volunteer regiments rendered valuable services to the Russian Army in the years of 1914-15-16.
On the other hand, the methods used by the Dashnagtzoutune in recruiting these regiments were so open and flagrant that it could not escape the attention of the Turkish authorities … Many Armenians believe that the fate of two million of their co-nationals in Turkey might not have proved so disastrous if more prudence had been used by the Dashnag leaders during the war. In one instance, one Dashnag leader, Armen Garo, who was also a member of the Turkish parliament, had fled to the Caucasus and had taken active part in the organization of volunteer regiments to fight the Turks. His picture, in uniform, was widely circulated in the Dashnag papers, and it was used by Talat Paha, the arch assassin of the Armenians, as an excuse for his policy of extermination.35
What then should be made of Papazian's Patriotism Perverted! Without denying that the Turks played a murderous role in the events analyzed, his long-ignored and even suppressed revelations indicate that the Armenians were far from innocent victims in what ensued. Indeed, Papazian's text makes it clear that incompetent but treacherous Armenians themselves were also to blame for what had befallen their cause. It is unfair to fix unique blame upon the Turks.
GUENTER LEWY'S CRITIC
A major contribution to the debate over the Armenian atrocities, Guenter Lewy's The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey,36 rejects the claim of a premeditated genocide as well as the apologist narrative of an unfortunate wartime excess, concluding that "both sides have used heavy-handed tactics to advance their cause and silence a full and impartial discussion of the issues in dispute." In his view, "the key issue in this quarrel is not the extent of Armenian suffering, but rather the question of premeditation: that is, whether the Young Turk regime during the First World War intentionally organized the massacres that took place."
Lewy questions the authenticity of certain documents alleged to contain proof of a premeditated genocide as well as the methods of Vakhakn N. Dadrian,37 one of the foremost current Armenian scholar-advocates of the genocide thesis, whom he accuses of "selective use of sources… [which] do not always say what Dadrian alleges" and "manipulating the statements of contemporary observers."
As for the argument that "the large number of Armenian deaths … [offers] proof that the massacres that took place must have been part of an overall plan to destroy the Armenian people," Lewy counters that it "rests on a logical fallacy and ignores the huge loss of life among Turkish civilians, soldiers, and prisoners-of-war due to sheer incompetence, neglect, starvation, and disease. All of these groups also experienced a huge death toll that surely cannot be explained in terms of a Young Turk plan of annihilation."
So how does Lewy explain what happened to the Armenians? "The momentous task of relocating several hundred thousand people in a short span of time and over a highly primitive system of transportation was simply beyond the ability of the Ottoman bureaucracy. … Under conditions of Ottoman misrule, it was possible for the country to suffer an incredibly high death toll without a premeditated plan of annihilation."38
Lewy's book was reviewed prominently and positively in two leading U.S. journals of Middle East studies. Edward J. Erickson noted the finding that "both camps have created a flawed supporting historiography by using sources selectively, quoting them out of context, and/or ignoring 'inconvenient facts,'" concluding that "simply having a large number of advocates affirming that the genocide is a historical fact does not make it so."39 Robert Berts, while claiming that "for the Turkish government to deny Ottoman responsibility for the Armenian suffering makes no sense," also stated that "what emerges from Lewy's study is the dire state of the empire and its population in 1915 and its inability to protect and feed its own Muslim citizenry, let alone the Armenians."40
Moreover, such distinguished scholars of Ottoman history as Bernard Lewis,41 Roderic Davison,42 J. C. Hurewitz,43 and Andrew Mango,44 among others, have all rejected the appropriateness of the genocide label for what occurred. On May 19, 1985, sixty-nine prominent academics in Turkish Ottoman and Middle Eastern studies (including Lewis) published a large advertisement in The New York Times and The Washington Post criticizing the U.S. Congress for considering the passage of a resolution that would have singled out for special recognition "the one and one half million people of Armenian ancestry who were victims of genocide perpetrated in Turkey between 1915 and 1923." Instead, they argued that such questions should be left for the scholarly community to decide.
Indeed, the Armenian massacres of 1915 did not come out of the blue but followed decades of Armenian violence and revolutionary activity that elicited Turkish counter violence. There is a plethora of Turkish writings documenting these unfortunate events, just as there are numerous Armenian accounts.45 The Armenians, of course, present themselves as freedom fighters in these earlier events, but it is possible to understand how the Ottomans saw them as treasonous subjects.
Moreover, throughout all these events, the Armenians were never more than a large minority even in their historic provinces.46 Yet they exaggerated their numbers before World War I and their losses during the war. Had the Armenian fatality figures been correct, very few would have survived the war. Instead, the Armenians managed to fight another war against the nascent Turkish republic in the wake of World War I for mastery in eastern Anatolia. Having lost, many Armenians claimed that what transpired after World War I was a renewed genocide. As Christians, the Armenians found a sympathetic audience in the West whereas the Muslim Turks were the West's historic enemy. Add to this the greater Armenian adroitness in foreign languages--hence their greater ability to present their case to the world--to understand why the Turks consider the genocide charge to be grossly unfair, especially since the Armenians have adamantly rejected any culpability on their part in this tragic event.
CONCLUSION
Without denying the tragic massacres and countless deaths the Armenians suffered during World War I, it is important to place them in their proper context. When this is done, the application of the term "genocide" to these events is inappropriate because the Turkish actions were neither unilateral nor pre-meditated. Rather, what transpired was part of a long-continuing process that in part started with the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, which triggered an influx of Balkan Muslims into Anatolia with the attendant deterioration of relations with the indigenous Christian Armenians.47
To make matters worse, Patriarch Nerses, an Ottoman subject and one of the leaders of the Armenian community, entered into negotiations with the victorious Russians with an eye to achieving Armenian autonomy or even independence. This was followed in coming decades by continued Armenian nationalist agitation, accompanied by the use of terror, aimed at provoking retaliation, which they hoped would be followed by European intervention. When World War I broke out, some Armenians supported the Russian enemy. Kurdish/Muslim-Armenian animosities also played a role in this process.48
As for the necessary attribute of premeditation to demonstrate genocide, there are no authentic documents to such effect. Although there are countless descriptions of the depravations suffered by the Armenians, they do not prove intent or premeditation. The so-called Andonian documents that purport to demonstrate premeditation are almost certainly a fabrication.49 And in response to the Armenian contention that the huge loss of Armenian lives illustrates premeditation, what then should be said about the enormous loss of Turkish lives among civilians, soldiers, and prisoners-of-war? Were these Turkish deaths also genocide or rather due to sheer incompetence, neglect, starvation, and disease? And if the latter were true of the ethnic Turkish population, they were all the more so in respect to an ethnic group that had incurred upon itself suspicion of acting as a fifth column in a time of war.
Even so, Armenian communities in such large Western cities as Istanbul and Smyrna were largely spared deportation probably because they were not in a position to aid the invading Russians. Is it possible to imagine Hitler sparing any Jews in Berlin, Munich, or Cologne from his genocidal rampage for similar reasons? If, as the Armenians allege, the Turkish intent was to subject their Armenian victims to a premeditated forced march until they died of exhaustion, why was this tactic not imposed on all Armenians? Therefore, without denying outright murders and massacres that today might qualify as war crimes, it seems reasonable to question the validity of referring to the Armenian tragedy as genocide.
1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N. Treaty Series (UNTS) 277, adopted by the General Assembly, Dec. 9, 1948, entered into force, Jan. 12, 1951.
2 Israel W. Charny, "Towards a Generic Definition of Genocide," in George J. Andreopoulos, ed., Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 64-94.
3 Stephen Katz, The Holocaust in Historical Context, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
4 Ton Zwaan, "On the Aetiology and Genesis of Genocides and Other Mass Crimes Targeting Specific Groups," Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, University of Amsterdam/Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Nov. 2003, p. 12.
5 David Rhode, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), p. 167; Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 34-5, 65-6, 138-9, 195-8,213-20,245-6; "Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica," U.N. doc. no. A/54/549, Nov. 15, 1999.
6 The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro), case 91, International Court of Justice, The Hague, Feb. 26, 2007.
7 "Documenting the Atrocities in Darfur," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2004.
8 The Guardian (London), Feb. 1, 2005.
9 Scott Straus, "Darfur and the Genocide Debate," Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 2005, pp. 128, 130.
10 Public Radio International, July 28, 2008; Voice of America, July 22, 2010.
11 Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 319-20.
12 Henry R. Huttenbach "Locating the Holocaust under the Genocide Spectrum: Toward a Methodology of Definition and Categorization," Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 3 (1988): 297
13 Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 319-20.
Henry R. Huttenbach "Locating the Holocaust under the Genocide Spectrum: Toward a Methodology of Definition and Categorization," Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 3 (1988): 297.
Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 312-3.
14 Kurt Jonassohn, "What Is Genocide?" in Helen Fein, ed, Genocide Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 21.
15 Gwynne Dyer, "Turkish 'Falsifiers' and Armenian 'Deceivers': Historiography and the Armenian Massacres," Middle Eastern Studies, Jan. 1976, pp. 99-107.
16 Christopher de Ballaigue, Rebel Land: Among Turkey's Forgotten Peoples (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), p. 104; M. Hakan Yavuz, "Contours of Scholarship on Armenian-Turkish Relations," Middle East Critique, Nov. 2011, pp. 231-51.
17 James Bryce, compiler, "The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16," Parliamentary Papers Miscellaneous, Great Britain, no. 31 (London: Joseph Cavston, 1916).
18 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), pp. vii-viii.
19 Arnold J. Toynbee, Acquaintances (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 241.
20 Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 272.
21 Edward J. Erickson, "The Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy, 1915," War in History, no. 2, 2008, p. 167.
22 Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2006), p. 187.
23 Erman Sahin, "Review Essay: A Scrutiny of Akcam's Version of History and the Armenian Genocide," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Aug. 2008, p. 316.
24 Erman Sahin, "Review Essay: The Armenian Question," Middle East Policy, Spring 2010, p. 157.
25 Taner Akcam, The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 19, 27.
26 Ibid., p. 203.
27 Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Ronald Grigor Suny, "Truth in Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Ottoman Armenians," American Historical Review, Oct. 2009, pp. 930-46.
28 Donald Bloxham, "The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy," Past & Present, Nov. 2003, p. 143.
29 Ibid., pp. 143, 186.
30 Ibid., p. 232.
31 Hovhannes Katchaznouni, "The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) Has Nothing To Do Anymore," Arthur A. Derounian, ed., Matthew A. Callender, trans. (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955), p. 2.
32 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
33 Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism Perverted: A Discussion of the Deeds and the Misdeeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the So-Called Dashnagtzoutune (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934).
34 See Christopher Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 354; Maggie Lewis, "Armenian-Americans," The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), Nov. 18, 1980.
35 Papazian, Patriotism Perverted, pp. 7, 13, 15, 21, 38-9.
36 Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2007.
37 For examples of Guenter Lewy's critiques of Dadrian's writings, see "Revisiting the Armenian Genocide," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2005, pp. 3-12; idem, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995); idem, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1999).
38 Lewy, The Armenian Massacres, pp. ix, 47, 51, 83-6, 250, 253, 258, 282.
39 Edward J. Erickson, "Lewy's 'The Armenian Massacres,'" Middle East Journal, Spring 2006, p. 377.
40 Robert Brenton Betts, "The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide/The Armenian Rebellion at Van," Middle East Policy, Spring 2008, p. 177.
41 See, for example, Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 356.
42 The New York Times, May 19, 1985.
43 Ibid.
44 Andrew Mango, Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (Woodstock and New York: The Overlook Press, 1999), p. 161.
45 See, for example, Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); Garegin Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo), Bank Ottoman: Memoirs of Armen Garo (Detroit: Armen Topouzian, 1990); James G. Mandalian, ed. and trans., Armenian Freedom Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouhen der Minasian (Boston: Hairenik Association, 1963).
46 See Justin McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire (New York: New York University Press, 1983), p. 115.
47 M. Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett, eds., War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011), pp. 1-13.
48 See Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 50, 131, 183.
49 Aram Andonian, ed., The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportations and Massacres of Armenians (London: 1920. Reprinted, Newtown Square, Pa.: Armenian Historical Research Association, 1964). For the case against the authenticity of these documents, see Sinasi Orel and Sureyya Yuca, The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction? (Nicosia: K. Rustem and Bros., 1986). For the counterclaim that newly found Ottoman archival source material vindicates the Adonian documents see, Akcam, The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity, p. xviii, fn. 22.
The liberal use of the term "genocide" has stirred numerous controversies and debates. Despite an international law definition, the word has been applied in some questionable instances. The deliberate murder of more than a million Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge, some of whose victims are pictured here, was undoubtedly a horrific crime, but does it fit the definition of genocide?
Bosnian Serbs sit behind their defense lawyers prior to a session at the U.N.'s International Criminal Tribunal/or the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, May 11, 1998. The tribunal convicted seven Bosnian Serbs of genocide for the Srebrenica massacre of some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims. However, the International Court of Justice, another U.N. organ, focused on Serbia's "intent" rather than the "outcome," absolving it of the charge of genocide in the court's judgment in Bosnia vs. Serbia Clearly, these contradictory decisions have added to the confusion about what legally constitutes genocide.
Historian Edward Erickson: "Nothing can justify the massacres of the Armenians … However, a case can be made that the Ottomans judged the Armenians to be a great threat to the [Ottoman] Armies and … that the Ottoman reaction was escalatory and responsive rather than premeditated and pre-planned." These Armenian fighters, pictured in the late 1890s, lend support to the Ottoman fear of a potential fifth column.
By Michael M. Gunter
Source: http://www.meforum.org/meq/
Michael M. Gunter
Department of Political Science
Tennessee Technological University
Cookeville, Tennessee 38505
Education
B.A. Columbia University, 1964; Major: American History
M.I.A. School of International Affairs, Columbia University, 1966; Area: Soviet Union
Ph.D. Kent State University, 1972; Major: International Relations; Minors: Comparative Politics, American Politics
Teaching Experience
Professor, Tennessee Technological University, 1981-present; Associate Professor 1976-1981; Assistant Professor 1972-1976;
Outstanding Faculty Award in Research, 1995-96;
Outstanding Faculty Award in Teaching, 1999-2000
College of Arts & Sciences Award for Research & Creative Activity, 2005
Ohio Valley Conference Excellence in Teaching Award, 2007
Marquis Who’s Who in America, 65th edition, 2011
Visiting Professor, University of Delaware for the U.S. Government Areas Studies Program, Short Course on the Kurds, 2007-.
Visiting Professor, The International University, Vienna, Austria, Summer 2002-present
Distinguished Visiting Professor Award, 2003
Certificate of Recognition in Publishing & Teaching, 2010
Adjunct Professor, Fisk University, Nashville, TN, Fall 2002
Instructor of ESL and American Culture, Shanghai Xuhui Education College, Shanghai, China, Summer 2001
Senior Fulbright-Hays Lecturer in International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, 1978-79
Temporary Assistant Professor, Kent State University, Summer 1972; Teaching Fellow, 1969-71; Instructor, 1967-69
Fulbright Abroad Awards
China, Summer 2000
Israel, Summer 1988
Turkey, Sept. 1978-June 1979
Courses Taught
International Politics, International Organization, International Law, Seminar In World Politics, Seminar in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, American Foreign Policy, European Politics, Third World Politics, American Politics, State and Local Government, Political Ideas and Issues, American Governmental Policies, USSR: Country & People, Arms Control & Nuclear Strategy, Middle Eastern Politics, Terrorism, Nationalism, International Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Diplomacy and Diplomatic Methods, Comparative World Politics, Middle East History, Intelligence Process, Islam: An Introduction, and The Kurds.
PUBLICATIONS
My research interests involve the Kurds, Turks, and Armenians; international law, organization and politics; nationalism; terrorism; and arms control.
Books and Monographs
Armenian History and the Question of Genocide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, in print).
Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011).
The A to Z of the Kurds (Lanham/Toronto/Plymouth, UK: Scarecrow Press, 2009). This is a reprint of my earlier Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 2004.
The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). “Professor Michael M. Gunter is well-placed to publish this upbeat and insightful study of the Kurdish situation in Iraq and Turkey. He has not hesitated to travel to Kurdish areas to meet with Kurdish leaders. . . . Gunter has established himself as one of the leading authorities on Kurdish issues, who dares to transit the political minefields of Kurdish studies without fear of criticism or political repercussions. . . . Gunter’s latest work is refreshing in its positive assessment of the future of the Kurds. It would be most useful to anyone interested in Iraq, Turkey, or the Kurds.” Middle East Journal 62 (Summer 2008), pp. 524-25. “The Kurds Ascending draws on much of much of Professor Gunter’s most recent work to provide a very up-to-date, riveting accounting of the monumental changes occurring vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue in Iraq and Turkey today. Written in clear, accessible language, the work does a fine job of focusing on the issues most central to understanding why the Kurds in Iraq are ascending and why a peaceful solution to ‘the Kurdish issue’ may finally be emerging in both Iraq and Turkey. The book works particularly well for readers who want more information, more analysis, and more facts than journalistic treatments of the topic generally provide, but who don’t want the overly dense jargon of many academic publications. . . . As someone born and raised in Quebec, this reader was very pleased to see Gunter’s solid familiarity with Canadian federalism and adept application of the example to a discussion of possible Iraqi political solutions. . . . Somehow Gunter manages to combine reasoned speculation with what documented and unclassified sources exist on Turkey’s Deep State and deliver a convincing account that reads like a spy novel. In English or French language sources, I know of no better discussion of the topic. . . . The Kurds Ascending provides both specialists and laymen alike an outstanding and clearly argued analysis of the evolving Kurdish problem.” Middle East Policy 15 (Winter 2008), pp. 171-73. “In his latest book Gunter . . . a prolific writer on the Kurds, provides a partially historical, partially journalistic narrative of recent developments that have augmented the power of Kurdish political forces in Iraq and Turkey. . . . Summing Up: Recommended.” Choice 45-7024 CIP, August 2008. “Professor Gunter has written an eminently readable, well-documented analysis that shows how the Kurdish question may be on the verge of a solution in Iraq and Turkey. Like his previous work, this book is polished and persuasive.” Tozun Bahcheli, Professor of Political Science, King’s University College, the University of Western Ontario. “Professor Gunter, in his characteristic lucid style, shows how federalism in Iraq, as well as EU-mandated and AK Party reforms in Turkey are cautiously helping lead to a solution to the long-running Kurdish problem in these two important states. This will provide a most welcomed insight into the future.” M. Hakan Yavuz, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Utah. “Kurds Ascending draws on much of Professor Gunter’s most recent work to provide a very up-to-date riveting account of the monumental changes occurring vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue today. Written in clear, accessible language yet chocked-full of interesting up-to-date information, Michael Gunter’s book should be of great interest to both those previously unfamiliar with the Kurds and specialists in Middle East politics as well.” David Romano, Assistant Professor of International Studies, Rhodes College.
The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism (co-edited with Mohammed M.A. Ahmed) (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2007). “Readers will find in this volume a collection of interesting studies covering all parts of Kurdistan. . . . The book will be of interest to a wide range of readers, especially students of nationalism and the modern history of the Middle East. . . . The book is a useful collection for the shelves of research libraries.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 41 (February 2009), pp. 154-56. “The essays gathered in this book analyze how Kurdish nationalism has evolved and the challenge it presents to the regional states.” Middle East Journal, 61 (Summer 2007), p. 556.
The Kurdish Question and the 2003 Iraqi War (co-edited with Mohammed M.A. Ahmed) (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2005). “The essays . . . deal with important topics and most stand the test of time very well. This book is quite readable for students, academics and the general public and is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the Kurdish people and the political, economic and social problems they have encountered or must resolve.” Journal of Third World Studies 24 (Fall 2007), p 219. “In the book, the 12 contributors investigate developments that affected the Kurds and Kurdish nationalism from the 1991 Persian Gulf War to the 2003 Iraqi War.” Middle East Journal 59 (Summer 2005), p. 513.
Historical Dictionary of the Kurds (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2004). “The value of this work is its timeliness. The 153 articles and book bibliographic entries are well organized. . . . The author [benefits] . . . by his wide knowledge of contemporary Kurdish politics, his acquaintance with many of the personages about whom he writes, and his wide travels among Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. . . . Anyone interested in the history and politics of the Kurds and the current politics of the Middle East will want to have these two books within reach on their bookshelves.” Middle East Journal 58 (Summer 2004), p. 514. “An eminent and prolific scholar, Gunter provides a useful introduction, a large bibliography, a short chronology, and some maps. . . . His work is an excellent complement . . . [and] is a fine ready reference source.” Choice (42-0699), October 2004. “Brilliant and committed. . . . This work provides good maps and a fantastic bibliography.” American Reference Books Annual (ARBA), Vol. 36, 2005, #352, p. 172. “A comprehensive dictionary of maps, a chronology, an introductory essay, a dictionary containing several hundred entries on various aspects of Kurdish experience and an extensive bibliography,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 28 (Fall 2004), p. 87. “This is a reference and innovative work written by the well-known scholar Michael M. Gunter. . . . This is a very original and scholarly volume, where entries are generally exhaustive and with detailed information. . . This important book . . . is to be greatly appreciated, and this volume is also a necessary support for libraries and those interested in the Near and Middle East.” Oriente Moderno XXV (LXXXVI), no.3, 2006, pp. 544-46. This book was the recipient of the Tennessee Technological University College of Arts & Sciences Award for Research & Creative Activity, 2005. “Timely . . . useful library reference . . . likely to be essential purchase . . . for libraries.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 33, no. 1, 2006, pp. 82-84.
Kurdish Exodus: From Internal Displacement to Disapora (co-edited with Mohammed M.A. Ahmed) (Sharon, MA: Ahmed Foundation for Kurdish Studies, 2002).
The Kurdish Question and International Law: An Analysis of the Legal Rights of the Kurdish People (co-edited with Mohammed M.A.Ahmed) (Oakton, VA: Ahmed Foundation for Kurdish Studies, 2000).
The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Dilemma (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). "Gunter has not only done his homework, but has also brought new insights to the understanding of Kurdish politics in Iraq, and the Iraqi opposition. . . . This is a well-written, highly readable, and concise discussion of the Kurdish movement in Iraq. Anyone interested in Iraq's future and the Kurdish national struggle within the geostrategic context of the Middle East should read this well-researched and informative book." Middle East Insight, 15 (Jan-Feb 2000), pp. 61-62. "Gunter, who was an active player in the politics of the region, explains the complex Kurdish politics in northern Iraq in a concise and readable manner. . . . Recommended for university and large urban libraries. Choice (37-2404). "This book . . . is a well-documented, detailed account of the recent Kurdish history in Iraq. . . . Gunter deserves credit for collecting these valuable personal details." Middle East Journal, 54 (Spring 2000), p. 305. "This volume presents a much-needed, highly accessible analysis. . . . objective and insightful. . . . Gunter's book joins his previous work in shedding light on a complex predicament." Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 34 (Summer 2000), pp. 124-25. "This is a welcome addition to the literature on contemporary Kurdish politics and international relations. . . . The book's informative and jargon-free style will make it a very useful resource for academics, journalists, and policy-makers interested in Kurdish political developments in general and Iraqi Kurdistan in particular. International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (May 2001), p.332. “Beautifully managed notes, bibliography and index. . . . Gunter provides analytical information and knowledge about the causes of the Kurdish predicament and defines the early history of the Kurdish people. . . . The author explains the different outlooks and dissimilar approaches to resolving the Kurdish problem. . . . He discloses many more interesting incidents in the war between Barzani and Talabani and the reality of external interference. His analysis of the civil war between the KDP and PUK is as coherent as any narrative on that Byzantine struggle. . . . Overall the author’s work is significant, worthwhile and informative. This is a unique contribution on the subject.” Journal of Third World Studies (Fall 2003), pp. 257-58. “The second chapter is an excellent account of the respective lives and personalities of the Barzanis . . . and of Jalal Talabani. . . . Gunter provides excellent coverage of U.S. policy toward the Iraqi Kurds and the related partisan politics and interdepartmental rivalries. . . . [This] is a well-written and amply documented book that should be of interest to both academics and the general public, and is an important contribution to scholarly literature on the Kurds.” Turkish Studies Association Journal 26 (Fall 2002), pp. 53-54.
The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). "Michael Gunter tackles this topic with skill and experience. . . . He packs an immense amount of mainly original and impeccably documented information . . . which he analyses with clarity and objectivity. . . . Consistently, the points made are illustrated by valuable factual detail from a host of sources." International Affairs (UK), 74 (April 1998), p. 476. "Gunter's clear writing style make[s] The Kurds and the Future of Turkey a valuable resource. It is an excellent addition to one's library either as an introductory text, or better, as a compliment to the texts on the conflict one already possesses." Journal of Conflict Studies, 19 (Fall 1999), p. 205. "This is a higly accessible compilation covering a substantial amount of territory. . . . Gunter also raises several paradoxes that point the way to potentially profitable lines of future research." Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 32 (Summer 1998), pp. 21-22. "Michael Gunter's account . . . provide(s) potentially useful comparative data for the further study of ethnicity and nationalism in the contemporary world." American Political Science Review 92 (December 1998), p. 962. "Where thoughtful analysis of the world's less visible trouble spots circulates, this analysis by the U.S. academic perhaps most closely identified with study of Turkey's Kurdish problem will appeal." Booklist (American Library Association), July 19, 1997. This "is a well-written and amply documented book that should be of interest to both academics and the general public, and is an important contribution to the increasing amount of scholarly literature on the Kurdish question." Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, 28 (Spring 1999), p. 79. "Libraries should . . . hold Michael Gunter's The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (1997) and his The Kurdish Question in Turkey (1990)." Daniel Pipes, editor of the Middle East Quarterly in Choice, Dec. 1998, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1007. “This book … focuses … attention on [the] PKK [and] examines its structure … with plenty of details and data…. Great merit to Gunter for his deep [analysis].” Politica Internazionale, (Nos. 1-2, 1998), pp. 221-223.
The Changing Kurdish Problem in Turkey (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict & Terrorism, 1994). "Professor Gunter's analysis is very impressive." Mehrdad Izady, editor, International Journal of Kurdish Studies.
The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). "Gunter provides a useful detailed account of political developments in and around Iraqi Kurdistan. . . . His scholarship is unexceptionable." Middle Eastern Studies, 30 (October 1994), pp. 990-91. "Carefully researched." International Affairs (London), 69 (October 1993), p. 808. "Gunter's timely work, with its solid research and data, helps to sort out fact from so much published fiction. . . . This work is a remarkably good piece of solid historical work." Kurdish Studies: An International Journal, 5 (Spring-Fall 1992), pp. 94-95. "Immensely helpful to scholars and students interested in learning about the complex and not very well understood Kurdish question in northern Iraq." Edmund Ghareeb, author of The Kurdish Question in Iraq. "Michael Gunter's succinct study . . . leaves little room for optimism." Times Literary Supplement, Aug. 27, 1993, p. 24. “Gunter’s study is a must read for anyone interested in Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdish question. It is an essential work for understanding the geopolitical and geostrategic changes that have taken place in the Middle East as a result of the Gulf War.” Robert Olson, Professor of History, University of Kentucky. “A crisp, concise, and up-to-date analysis of one of the most important issues in the Middle East today. In this highly readable book, Professor Gunter adroitly guides the reader through the labyrinth of Kurdish politics in Iraq. Essential reading for students of the modern Middle East.” Nader Entessar, Professor of Political Science, Spring Hill College.
The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). "A much-needed contribution to scholarly analysis of the Kurdish issue in the region. . . . An informative volume that will be useful to students of Middle Eastern and international politics, as well as those interested in the politics of multiethnic societies in the Third World." Middle East Journal, 45 (Autumn 1991), p. 685. "The book provides valuable information, much of it not readily available to many readers, including specialists on Turkey." Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, 16 (April 1992), pp. 103-104. "Gunter has an excellent command of the original source material and his book is well documented. It is the only English language book to focus specifically on the Turkish Kurds." International Journal on Group Rights, 1 (1993), p. 72.
Transnational Armenian Activism (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict & Terrorism, 1990). "Professor Gunter's carefully written and meticulous brief on the subject demands attention, and provides a clear guide in a murky area." British Army Review, 95 (August 1990), p. 92.
"Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People": A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986). "This is in every respect a splendid book, which every university library and individual interested in the contemporary Middle East ought to purchase." Middle East Studies Bulletin, 21 (December 1987), p. 206. "Professor Michael Gunter's study of contemporary Armenian terrorism is . . . carefully chronicled, and there is much material which helps to explain subsequent developments. . . well documented. . . . Gunter has made a notable contribution." Middle Eastern Studies, 25 (October 1989), pp. 539-41. "The book is an important one for anyone requiring a systematic account of a terrorist movement that began attacking Turkish officials and offices." Christian Science Monitor, March 10, 1987, p. 24.
Chapters in books
“Turgut Ozal and the Kurdish Question,” in Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue, eds. Marlies Cashier and Joost Jongerden (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 85-100.
“Prospects for the Kurdish Future in Iraq and Turkey,” in The Kurdish Policy Imperative, eds. Robert Lowe and Gareth Stansfield (London: Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 2010), pp. 192-206.
“Turkey, EU & International Relations,” in Fifth International Conference on the EU, Turkey and the Kurds, ed. by EU Turkey Civic Commission (London: Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2010), pp. 60-77.
“How the Resolution of the Kurdish Question Can Open the Road for Democracy in Turkey and the Middle East,” in Fourth International Conference on the EU, Turkey and the Kurds: European Parliament, Brussels 3rd-4th December 2007, ed. by EU Turkey Civic Commission (London: Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2009), pp. 118-23.
“Bir Cozum Onerisi: Turkiye’nin Derin Devletinin Ehlilestirilmesi,” [A Proposal: Taming the Deep State in Turkey] in Turkiye’de Kurtler: Baris Sureci Icin Temel Gereksinimler [ The Kurds in Turkey: The Main Requirements for a Peace Process], ed. by Ulirike Dufner, Heinrich Boll Stiftung Dernegi (Istanbul, Turkey: Birinci Baski, 2008), pp. 30-45.
“Uyusmazliklarin Hallinde Uluslararasi Oyuncularin Rol: Turkiye ve Avrupa Birligi,” [Solving an International Conflict: Turkey and the European Union], ed. by Ulirike Dufner, Heinrich Boll Stiftung Dernegi (Istanbul, Turkey: Birinci Baski, 2008), pp. 155-65.
“Turkish Business and the Kurdistan Region,” in The Kurdistan Region: Invest in the Future, ed. by Brendan O’Leary (Great Britain: Newsdesk Media Inc., 2007), pp. 100-101.
“The Deep State Roadblock to Turkey’s EU Candidacy,” in Third International Conference on the EU, Turkey and the Kurds: European Parliament, Brussels, 16th-17th October 2006, ed. by EU Turkey Civic Commission (Great Britain: Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2007), pp. 59-65.
“Re-Evaluating the Kurdish Question,” in Identity Conflicts: Can Violence Be Regulated? ed. by J. Craig Jenkins and Esther E. Gottlieb (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2007), pp. 113-130.
“Ocalan’s Capture as a Catalyst for Democracy and Turkey’s Candidacy for Accession to the European Union,” in Kurdish Identity: Human Rights and Political Status, ed. by Charles G. MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2007), pp. 35-55. “Michael Gunter’s apt analysis of how the capture of Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan catalyzed Turkey’s EU accession drive stands the test of time.” Middle East Quarterly 15 (Summer 2008). “Provides a cogent and detailed analysis . . . realistically outlining the many obstacles, including the self-interest of the powerful Turkish military.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 41 (August 2009), p. 533.
“The Modern Origins of Kurdish Nationalism,” in The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. by Mohammed M.A. Ahmed and Michael M. Gunter (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2007), pp. 1-17.
“Federalism and the Kurds of Iraq: The Solution or the Problem?” in The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics, ed. by Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod (London: Saqi Books, 2006), pp. 231-257.
“The Kurdish Problem in International Politics,” in Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges, ed. by Joseph S. Joseph (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 96-121.
“Kurdistan,” in Encyclopedia of the Developing World, Vol. 2 (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 920-921.
“Turkish Membership in the EU and the Kurds,” in International Conference on Turkey, the Kurds and the EU: European Parliament, Brussels, 22-23 November 2004 – Conference Papers, ed. by Mark Muller, Claire Brigham, Kariane Westrheim and Kerim Yildiz (Great Britain: EU Turkey Civic Commission, 2005), pp. 121-30.
“The Kurdish Minority Identity in Iraq,” in Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies, ed. by Maya Shatzmiller (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), pp. 263-82. “Whereas the volume’s comparative analysis of religious minorities or communities . . . is somewhat problematic, its examination of Muslim ethnic minorities—Berbers in Morocco and Algeria, Kurds in Turkey and Iraq—is more satisfactory. These four cases are well presented by David L. Crawford, Azzedine Layachi, M. Hakan Yavuz, and Michael M. Gunter, respectively.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 39 (August 2007), p. 470.
“Turkey’s New Neighbor, Kurdistan,” in The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, ed. by Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), pp. 219-32. “The Kurds needed to restrain themselves, as Michael Gunter makes clear in an excellent chapter on Turkey.” Government and Opposition, 41, No. 4, p. 592.
“Kurdish Prospects in Post-Saddam Iraq,” in The Kurdish Question and the 2003 Iraqi War, ed. by Mohammed M.A. Ahmed and Michael M. Gunter (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press, 2005), pp. 71-96.
“The Northern Alliance in the Iraqi Dilemma,” in Burning Issues in World Politics: Cyprus, Iraq & Palestine, ed. by Jacqueline S. Ismael and Mehmet Tahiroglu (Gazimagusa, North Cyprus: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 2004), pp. 97-112.
“United States Foreign Policy toward the Kurds,” in The Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. by Lokman I. Meho (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 2004), pp. 3-12.
“Kurds: Should the Kurds Have an Independent State? Viewpoint: No,” in History in Dispute, Vol. 14: The Middle East Since 1945, First Series, ed. by David W. Lesch (Farmington Hills, MI: St. James Press, 2004), pp. 171, 173-74.
“Die Zukunft der Kurden im Irak” [The Future of the Kurds in Iraq], in Der Irak: Land Zwischen Krieg und Frieden [Iraq: Land Between War and Peace], ed. by Kai Hafez and Birgit Schabler (Heidelberg, Germany: Palmyra, 2003), pp. 208-34.
“Turkey,” in Encyclopedia of World Terrorism: 1996-2002 (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 2003), pp. 351-54.
“Middle East: The Kurds Struggle for ‘Kurdistan,’” in Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 2003), pp. 151-59.
“After the War: President Bush and the Kurdish Uprising,” in From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush, ed. by Meena Bose and Rosanna Perotti (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 2002) pp. 507-20.
"The Legal Rights of Refugee and Internally Displaced Kurds under International Law," in Kurdish Exodus: From Internal Displacement to Diaspora (Sharon MA: Ahmed Foundation for Kurdish Studies, 2002), pp. 111-32.
"The Kurdish Question and International Law," in The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). pp. 31-56.
"Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan: Their Influence on Neighboring States and the Kurdish Movement in Surrounding States," in Irakisch-Kurdistan: Status und Perspektiven (Berlin: Awadani e.V, 1999), pp. 65-80.
"Transnational Armenian Terrorism," in Beyond the Soviet Union: The Fragmentation of Power, ed. by Max Beloff (Aldershot (UK): Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 23-57.
"Dealing with Terrorism: The Reagan Record," in The Proceedings of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Conference, ed. by Eric J. Schmertz, Natalie Datlof and Alexej Ugrinsky (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), pp. 167-80.
"The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Iraqi Kurdistan," in Swords and Plowshares: The United Nations in Transition, ed. by Ron Wheeler and Howard McConnell (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1997), pp. 117-131.
"Kurdish Infighting: The PKK-KDP Conflict," in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, ed. by Robert Olson (Lexington: The University Press Of Kentucky, 1996), pp. 50-62.
"The Kurdish Peacekeeping Operation in Northern Iraq, 1991," in Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution, ed. by David A. Charters (Fredericton, N.B.: Centre for Conflict Studies, 1994), pp. 97-110.
"The Iranian Hostages Case and Its Implications for the International Law of Diplomacy," in Jimmy Carter: Keeping Faith, ed. by Herbert D. Rosenbaum & Alexej Ugrinsky (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 191-210.
"Turkey and the Armenians," in Multidimensional Terrorism, ed. by Martin Slann & Bernard Schechterman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1987), pp. 57-71.
"On Turkish Students," in The Fulbright Experience, 1946-1986, ed. by Arthur P. Dudden and Russell R. Dynes (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 281-284.
"Contemporary Aspects of Armenian Terrorism," in International Terrorism and the Drug Connection (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984), pp. 103-l44.
Journal articles
I have published more than 100 articles in scholarly books or journals including Middle East Journal, American Journal of International Law, Current History, Orbis, International Organization, Middle East Quarterly, Middle East Policy, Orient, World Affairs, and Third World Quarterly, among numerous others.
“Between Baghdad and Ankara: The Kurdistan Regional Government’s Delicate Balance.” Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) 8:41 (November 11, 2010).
“Kurdish-Arab Tensions and Irbil-Baghdad Relations.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 33 (Spring 2010), pp. 40-47.
“Special Report: The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement.” (with Dirk Rochtus) Middle East Critique 19 (Summer 2010), pp. 157-72.
“Kurdish-Arab Tensions and Irbil-Baghdad Relations.” (shortened version) Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) 8:12 (March 26, 2010).
“Navigating the EU Shoals: Turkey’s AK Party and the Kurds.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 32 (Winter 2009), pp. 19-37.
“Review Essay: Kurdish Scholarship Comes of Age,” Middle East Policy 15 (Fall 2008), pp. 173-77.
“The Permanent and New Realities Facing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG): Options and Prospects.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28 (August 2008), pp. 237-49.
“The AKP Catalyst: Progressive Islamists and Ambitious Kurds.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 9 (Summer/Fall 2008), pp. 59-68.
“The Kurdish Road to Turkish Democracy.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 31 (Winter 2008), pp. 1-12.
“Discussing Recent Literature on Turkish Politics: The Myth within the Myth.” Insight Turkey 10 (No. 1, 2008), pp. 149-53.
“Turkish Paradox: Progressive Islamists vs. Reactionary Secularists.” (with M. Hakan Yavuz) Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16 (Fall 2007), pp. 287-298.
“Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal.” Journal of Conflict Studies 27 (Winter 2007), pp. 109-28.
“Intra-Kurdish Disputes in Northern Iraq.” Terrorism Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation) 5 (May 10, 2007), pp. 1-4, (on-line).
“Turkey’s Floundering EU Candidacy and Its Kurdish Problem.” Middle East Policy 14 (Spring 2007), pp. 117-23.
“The Changing Dynamics in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 30 (Fall 2006), pp. 1-14.
“Deep State: The Arcane Parallel State in Turkey.” Orient 47 (September 2006), pp. 334-48.
“The Iraqi Kurds’ Federalism Imperative.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 29 (Winter 2006), pp. 1-10.
“Kurdistan’s Revival.” Worth (Robb Report) 14 (May 2005), pp. 32-34.
“Federalism and the Kurds: The Solution or the Problem?” Orient 46 (March 2005), pp. 45-66.
“The Continuing Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan.” (with M. Hakan Yavuz) Middle East Policy 12 (Spring 2005), pp. 122-33.
“The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray.” World Affairs 167 (Winter 2005), pp. 113-23.
“The Consequences of a Failed Iraqi State: An Independent Kurdish State in Northern Iraq?” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 27 (Spring 2004), pp. 1-12.
“The Kurdish Question in Perspective.” World Affairs 166 (Spring 2004), pp. 197-205.
“Why Kurdish Statehood Is Unlikely.” Middle East Policy 11 (Spring 2004), pp. 106-10.
“United States-Turkish Intelligence Liaison Since World War II.” Journal of Intelligence History 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 33-46..
“Kurdish Future in a Post-Saddam Iraq.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23 (April 2003), pp. 9-23.
"Chinese Kaleidoscope." World Affairs 165 (Spring 2003), pp. 197-203.
"The Bane of Kurdish Disunity." Orient 42 (December 2001), pp. 605-616.
"Qaddafi Reconsidered." Journal of Conflict Studies 21 (Spring 2001), pp. 122-30.
"The Kurdish Nation." (with M. Hakan Yavuz) Current History 100 (January 2001), pp. 33-39.
"The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Ocalan's Capture." Third World Quarterly 21 (October 2000), pp. 849-69.
"Turkey Suspends Ocalan's Execution." Cultural Survival Quarterly 24 (Summer 2000), pp. 26-27.
"Libya and the U.S.: A Changed Political Dynamic?" (with Charles G. MacDonald) Middle East Insight 15 (May-June 2000), pp. 15-19.
"United States Foreign Policy Toward the Kurds." Orient 40 (September 1999), pp. 427-37.
"Should Turkey Execute Ocalan?" Cultural Survival Quarterly 23 (Fall 1999), pp. 13-14.
"The Iraqi Opposition and the Failure of U.S. Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 12 (Summer 1999), pp. 135-67.
"An Interview with the PKK's Ocalan." Journal of Conflict Studies 18 (Fall 1998), pp. 104-109.
“Susurluk: The Connection between Turkey's Intelligence Community and Organized Crime.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 11 (Summer 1998), pp. 119-41.
"Interview: Abdullah Ocalan, Head of the PKK." Middle East Quarterly 5 (June 1998), pp. 79-85.
"Turkey and Iran Face Off in Kurdistan." Middle East Quarterly 5 (March 1998), pp. 32-40.
"The Silent Coup: The Secularist-Islamist Struggle in Turkey." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 21 (Spring 1998), pp. 1-12.
"The Foreign Policy of the Iraqi Kurds." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 20 (Spring 1997), pp. 1-19.
"The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq." Middle East Journal 50 (Spring 1996), pp. 225-41.
"The Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the Future of the Iraqi Opposition." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 19 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-20.
"A Kurdish State in Northern Iraq?" Humboldt Journal of Social Relations (Special issue entitled “Protracted Conflict”) 20 (no. 2; 1995), pp. 45-94.
"The Kurdish Factor in Middle Eastern Politics." International Journal of Kurdish Studies 8 (nos. 1 & 2; 1995), pp. 94-109.
"Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Rebellion in Iraq: The Intelligence Factor." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 7 (Winter 1994), pp. 465-74.
"The Kurdish Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy." Journal of Third World Studies 11 (Fall 1994), pp. 440-72.
"Countering Terrorism: The Reagan Record." Conflict Quarterly 14 (Summer 1994), pp. 7-20.
"A Trip to Free Kurdistan." PS: Political Science and Politics 27 (March 1994), pp. 146-48.
"Review Essay: The Kurds." Conflict Quarterly 13 (Fall 1993), pp. 74-90.
"A De Facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq." Orient 34 (December 1993), pp. 379-401; and Third World Quarterly 14 (no. 2; 1993), pp. 295-319.
"Foreign Influences on the Kurdish Insurgency in Iraq." Orient 34 (March 1993), pp. 105-19; and Conflict Quarterly 12 (Fall 1992), pp. 7-24.
"The Gulf War and Turkey: New Attitudes Towards the Kurds." Journal of Asian and African Affairs 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 60-78.
"The Historical Origins of the Armenian-Turkish Enmity." Journal of Armenian Studies (Special Issue entitled "Genocide & Human Rights: Lessons from the Armenian Experience") 4 (nos. 1 & 2; 1992), pp. 257-88.
"Turkey and the Kurds: New Developments in 1991." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 15 (Winter 1991), pp. 32-45.
"The Iraqi Kurds after the 1991 Gulf War." Crossroads: A Socio-Political Journal (no. 32, 1991), pp. 3-29.
"Students' Response to the Crisis in Kuwait Reflects a Western-Oriented Parochialism." The Chronicle of Higher Education, Oct. 3, 1990, p. B2.
"Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey." Conflict Quarterly 11 (Spring 1991), pp. 7-29.
"The Suppression of the Kurds in Turkey." Kurdish Times 3 (no. 2; 1990), pp. 5-16.
"The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 13 (Summer 1990), pp. 57-81.
"Kurdish Militancy in Turkey: The Case of PKK." Crossroads: A Socio-Political Journal (Israel), (no. 29; 1989), pp. 43-59.
"Political Instability in Turkey During the 1970s." Conflict Quarterly 9 (Winter 1989), pp. 63-77.
"Why Do the Turks Deny They Committed Genocide Against the Armenians?" Orient (Deutsches Orient-Institut) 30 (September 1989), pp. 490-493.
"The Kurdish Problem in Turkey." Middle East Journal 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 389-406.
"The Armenian Dashnak Party in Crisis." Crossroads: A Socio-Political Journal (Israel) (no. 26; 1987), pp. 75-88.
"Cycles of Terrorism: The Question of Contemporary Turkish Counterterror and Harassment Against the Armenians." Journal of Political Science 14 (Spring 1986), pp. 58-73.
"Contemporary Armenian Terrorism." Terrorism: An International Journal 8 (no. 3; 1986), pp. 213-52.
"Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism." Conflict Quarterly 5 (Fall 1985), pp. 31-52.
"The Historical Origins of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 9 (Fall 1985), pp. 77-96
"UN Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan and the Calhounian Connection." (with Ronnie W. Faulkner) Teaching Political Science 13 (Winter 1985-86), pp. 68-82.
"The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey." Orient (Deutsches Orient-Institut) 24 (December 1983), pp. 610-37.
"The Gore Proposal: A Passage Through the Impasse of Nuclear Arms Control?" Arms Control (England) 4 (December 1983), pp. 236-49.
"Teaching Political Science in a Turkish University: The Experience of a Fulbright Lecturer." PS (American Political Science Association) 16 (Winter 1984), pp. 50-60.
"The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey." Orbis 27 (Summer 1983), pp. 447-77.
"Academe in the Third World: The Experience of a Fulbright Lecturer." International Studies Notes 9 (Fall 1982), pp. 4-9.
"Violating the Inviolable: The Iranian Hostage Case and Its Implications." (with Sanford R. Silverburg) Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 5 (Fall 1981), pp. 52-76.
"The Disarming Simplicity of Disarmament." METU Studies in Development 7 (nos. 1 & 2; 1980), pp. 193-98.
"Self-Determination or Territorial Integrity: The United Nations in Confusion." World Affairs 141 (Winter 1979), pp. 203-16.
"Recent Proposals in the United Nations to Amend the Charter." Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 10 (Summer 1978), pp. 763-83.
"Toward a New Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations?" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 10 (Fall 1977), pp. 557-87.
"What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?" American Journal of International Law 71 (January 1977), pp. 110-24.
"Switzerland and the United Nations." International Organization 30 (Winter 1976), pp. 129-52.
"Self-Determination in the Recent Practice of the United Nations." World Affairs 137 (Fall 1974), pp. 150-65.
"Liechtenstein and the League of Nations: A Precedent for the United Nations Ministate Problem?" American Journal of International Law 68 (July 1974), pp. 496-501.
"The Problem of Ministate Membership in the United Nations System: Recent Attempts Toward a Solution." Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 12 (1973), pp. 464-86.
Book Reviews and Notices
The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq, by Denise Natali in Middle East Journal, Autumn 2010, pp. 662-64.
Rebel Land: Among Turkey’s Forgotten Peoples, by Christopher de Bellaigue in Middle East Journal, Winter 2010, pp. 148-49.
Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, by M. Hakan Yavuz in Middle East Journal, Summer 2009, pp. 511-12.
European and Turkish Voices in Favour and Against Turkish Accession to the European Union, ed. by Christiane Timmerman, Dirk Rochtus, and Sara Mels in Middle East Policy, Summer 2009, pp. 181-82.
Kurdistan: Crafting of National Selves, by Christopher Houston in Middle East Journal, Spring 2009, pp. 335-37.
The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands, by Jeremy Salt in Middle East Journal, Winter 2009, pp. 157-58.
The European Union and Turkish Accession: Human Rights and the Kurds, by Kerim Yildiz and Mark Muller in Middle East Journal, Autumn 2008, pp. 724-25.
The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War, by Joost Jongerden in Middle East Journal, Summer 2008, pp. 526-28.
The Kemalists: Islamic Revival and the Fate of Secular Turkey, by Muammer Kaylan in Insight Turkey, Vol. 10; No. 2, 2008, pp. 156-58.
The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation, by Metin Heper in Middle East Journal, Spring 2008, pp. 344-46.
Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence, by Aliza Marcus in Middle East Policy, Spring 2008, pp. 172-75.
The Unwelcome Neighbour: Turkey’s Kurdish Policy, by Asa Lundgren in Middle East Journal, Winter 2008, pp. 167-68.
Iraq: People, History, Politics, by Gareth Stansfield in Middle East Journal, Fall 2007, pp. 719-20.
Prison Writings: The Roots of Civilisation, by Abdullah Ocalan in Middle East Policy, Fall 2007, pp. 166-167.
The Kurds in Iran: The Past, Present and Future, by Kerim Yildiz and Tanyel B. Taysi in Middle East Journal, Summer 2007, pp. 539-40.
Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? by Harun Arikan; and The EU & Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone? ed. by Michael Lake in Middle East Journal, Spring 2007, pp. 363-64.
The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity, by David Romano in Perspectives on Politics (APSA), March 2007, pp. 196-97.
The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development, by Wadie Jwaideh in Middle East Journal, Winter 2007, pp. 167-168.
The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity, by David Romano in Middle East Journal, Winter 2007, pp. 168-170.
The Kurds: A People in Search of Their Homeland, by Kevin McKiernan in MESA Bulletin, December 2006, pp. 289-90.
The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq since the Iraqi War, by Robert Olson in MESA Bulletin, December 2006, pp. 291-92.
The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War without End, by Peter W. Galbraith in Middle East Journal, Autumn 2006, pp. 799-801.
The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide, by Guenter Lewy in International Journal of Middle East Studies, November 2006, pp. 598-600.
Turkey’s Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan, by Ali Kemal Ozcan in International Journal of Middle East Studies, November 2006, pp. 600-601.
The Kurds in Syria: The Forgotten People, by Kerim Yildiz in Middle East Journal, Summer 2006, pp. 587-88.
The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, by Denise Natali in Middle East Journal, Spring 2006, pp. 391-92.
The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights, by Kerim Yildiz in Middle East Journal, Winter 2006, pp. 176-77.
Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National Identity: Heroes and Patriots, Traitors and Foes, by Martin Strohmeier in International Journal of Middle East Studies, May 2005, pp. 269-70.
“Starving Armenians”: America and the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1930 and After, by Merrill D. Peterson in International Journal of Middle East Studies, May 2005, pp. 296-97.
The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division? by Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield; and The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, by Kerim Yildiz in Middle East Journal, Spring 2005, pp. 312-14.
Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. by Abbas Vali in Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, December 2004, pp. 247-49.
Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries, by Hakan Ozoglu in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, October 2004, pp. 408-10.
Great Powers, Oil and the Kurds in Mosul: (Southern Kurdistan/Northern Iraq), 1910-1925, by Habibollah Atarodi; and Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy, by Gareth R.V. Stansfield in Middle East Journal, Summer 2004, pp. 511-13.
Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, by M. Hakan Yavuz in Middle East Policy, Summer 2004, pp. 183-84.
Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia, 1991-2000, by Robert Olson in International Journal of Turkish Studies, Spring 2002, pp. 146-50.
Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey, by Paul White in Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2002, p. 83.
War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications, by Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb in Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Winter 2001, pp. 262-64.
Kurdish Culture and Society: An Annotated Bibliography, compiled by Lokman I. Meho and Kelly L. Maglaughlin in Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Winter 2001, pp. 267-77.
Mehmedin Kitabi: Guneydogu'da Savasmis Askerler Anlatiyor (Mehmet's Book: Soldiers Who Have Fought in the Southeast Speak Out), by Nadire Mater in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Spring 2000, pp. 149-51.
Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question, by Abdullah Ocalan in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Spring 2000, pp.146-49.
Kurdish Diasporas: A Comparative Study of Kurdish Refugee Communities, by Osten Wahlbeck in International Migration, No. 5, 2000, pp. 117-18.
After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan, by Jonathan C. Randal in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Fall 1999, pp. 44-46.
The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations from World War I to 1998 by Robert Olson in Political Science Quarterly, Summer 1999, pp. 319-20.
Turkey's Kurdish Question, by Henri J. Barkey and Graham Fuller in Political Science Quarterly, Spring 1999, pp. 164-65.
German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity, by Vahakn N. Dadrian in Middle East Journal, Autumn 1998, pp. 622-24.
Imperial Meanderings and Republican By-Ways: Essays on Eighteenth Century Ottoman and Twentieth Century History of Turkey, by Robert Olson in Middle East Journal, Spring 1998, pp. 297-98.
After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan, by Jonathan C. Randal in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Spring 1998, pp. 164-67.
The Kurds and Kurdistan: A Selective and Annotated Bibliography, by Lokman I. Meho in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Spring 1998, pp. 167-68.
Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism, by David Tucker in Journal of Conflict Studies, Spring 1998, pp. 164-65.
Journey Through Kurdistan, by Mary Ann Bruni Smothers; and Ataturk's Children: Turkey and the Kurds, by Jonathan Rugman and Roger Hutchings in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Spring 1997, pp. 36-37.
Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, by Brian C. Smith in Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 1997, pp. 276-78.
Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments, ed. by Kemal H. Karpat in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Fall 1996, pp. 49-52.
A Modern History of the Kurds, by David McDowall in Middle East Journal, Autumn 1996, pp. 600-601.
The Kurdish Struggle: 1920-94, by Edgar O'Ballance in International Journal of Kurdish Studies, nos. 1 & 2; 1996, pp. 159-61.
A Modern History of the Kurds, by David McDowall in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Spring 1996, pp. 68-70.
Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, by Mordechai Nisan in International Journal of Kurdish Studies, nos. 1 & 2; 1996, pp. 118-20.
Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty, by Gidon Gottlieb in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Fall 1995, pp. 80-81.
The Cradle of Mankind: Life in Eastern Kurdistan, by W.A. Wigram and Edgar T.A. Wigram in Journal of the Assyrian Academic Society, no. 2; 1995, pp. 126-30.
Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role, by Andrew Mango in Middle East Journal, Summer 1995, pp. 523-24.
The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992), by Ismet M. Imset in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Spring 1995, pp. 120-22.
The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, ed. by Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl; No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds, by John Bulloch and Harvey Morris; The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992), by Ismet M. Imset; and The Kurdish Tragedy, by Gerard Chaliand in International Journal of Kurdish Studies, nos. 1 & 2; 1995, pp. 133-45.
The Kurdish Tragedy, by Gerard Chaliand in Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 1995, pp. 432-35.
The Middle East and Problems of Democracy, by Heather Deegan in Journal of Third World Studies, Fall 1994, pp. 606-608.
Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century, by Paul B. Henze; and Turkish Democracy and the American Alliance, by Paul B. Henze in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Fall 1994, pp. 158-62.
Kurdish Ethnonationalism, by Nader Entessar in International Journal of Kurdish Studies, nos. 1 & 2; 1994, pp. 121-22.
Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World, by Kanan Makiya in International Journal of Middle East Studies, August 1994 pp. 550-52.
The Kurds: A Concise Handbook, by Mehrdad R. Izady in International Journal of Middle East Studies, May 1994, pp. 323-25.
No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds, by John Bulloch and Harvey Morris in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Spring 1994, pp. 153-56.
Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, by Martin van Bruinessen; and Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan: 1918-1985, by Amir Hassanpour in International Journal of Kurdish Studies, Fall 1993, pp. 135-38.
Kurdish Ethnonationalism, by Nader Entessar in International Journal of Middle East Studies, November 1993, pp. 719-21.
Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, ed. by Peter Andrews in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, April 1993, pp. 174-76.
Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, The Prospects, by Francis P. Hyland in Conflict Quarterly, Summer 1992, pp. 80-82.
Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament, by Valerie Adams; and Chemical Weaponry: A Continuing Challenge, by Edward M. Spiers in American Political Science Review, June 1991, pp. 679-81.
Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations, by Jacques Derogy; and Judgment unto Truth: Witnessing the Armenian Genocide, by Ephraim K. Jernazian in Middle East Journal, Spring 1991, pp. 343-44.
The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story, by Heath W. Lowry in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, March 1991, pp. 168-70.
The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, by Robert Olson in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, March 1991, pp. 170-72.
Istanbul Intrigues: A True-Life Casablanca, by Barry Rubin in International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, No. 3, 1992, pp. 376-78.
The Ottoman Armenians: Victims of Great Power Diplomacy, by Salahi R. Sonyel in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, September 1990, pp. 244-47.
An Introduction to Kurdish Rugs and Other Weavings, by William Eagleton in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, September 1989, pp. 115-117.
The Armenian Genocide in Perspective, ed. by Richard Hovannisian; and Britain and the Armenian Question 1915-1923, by Akaby Nassibian in International Journal of Middle East Studies, August 1989, pp. 419-422.
A Myth of Terror, Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context, by Erich Feigl in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, March 1989, pp. 54-57.
Issues in the History of International Relations: The Role of Issues in the Evolution of the State System, by Robert F. Randle in Journal of Politics, February 1989, pp. 221-222.
The T.E. Lawrence Puzzle, ed. by Stephen E. Tabachnick; and Explorations in Doughty's "Arabia Deserta", ed. by Stephen E. Tabachnick in Orient, June 1988, pp. 305-307.
The Eastern Question: Imperialism and the Armenian Community, ed. by M. Abdulhaluk Cay in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, March 1988, pp. 30-31.
The T.E. Lawrence Puzzle, ed. by Stephen E. Tabachnick in Turcica (France), 1987, 320-321.
Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Politics, by Marc A. Celmer in Journal of Politics, May 1988, pp. 521-523.
The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction?, by Sinasi Orel and Sureyya Yuca in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, September 1987, pp. 92-95.
The T.E. Lawrence Puzzle, by Stephen E. Tabachnick in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, March 1987, pp. 33-35.
The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed, by Kamuran Gurun in Middle East Journal, Winter 1987, pp. 102-104.
ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool, by Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, September 1986, pp. 107-109.
World Politics and International Law, by Francis A. Boyle in American Political Science Review, June 1986, pp.712-713.
The United Nations: Reality and Ideal, by Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker in American Political Science Review, December 1985, pp. 1229-1230.
Sex Roles, Family, and Community in Turkey, ed. by Cigdem Kagitcibasi in Turcica (France), 17 (1985), pp. 304-306.
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926), ed. by the University of the Bosphorus in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, September 1985, pp. 31-35.
Law, Morality, and the Relations of States, by Terry Nardin in American Political Science Review, March 1985, pp. 270-271.
Documents, ed. by the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, September 1984, p. 28.
Documents on Ottoman-Armenians. Volume II, ed. by the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, September 1984, pp. 29.
British Documents on Ottoman Armenians: II (1880-1890), ed. by Bilal N. Simsir in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, September 1984, pp. 29-31.
British Documents on Ottoman Armenians: I (1856-1880), ed. by Bilal N. Simsir in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, March 1984, p. 37.
Ermeni Dosyasi, by Kamuran Gurun in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, March 1984, pp. 37-38.
A History of the United Nations. Volume 1. The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955, by Evan Luard in American Political Science Review, June 1984, p. 566.
Change Processes in International Organizations, by Lawrence T. Farley in American Political Science Review, June 1983, pp. 525-526.
The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus, by Pierre Oberling in The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, March 1983, pp. 4l-46.
People, States, and World Order, by Louis Beres in American Political Science Review, June 1982, pp. 445-446.
Your Man at the UN: People, Politics and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy, by Seymour Finger in Journal of Politics, February 1982, p. 298.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, by Mohamed I. Shaker in American Political Science Review, June 1981, pp. 567-568.
Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options, by Elmer Plischke in American Journal of International Law, January 1978, pp. 2l0-ll.
In Search of a Responsible World Society: The Social Teachings of the World Council of Churches, by Paul Bock in American Political Science Review, September 1977, p. l280.
French Politics in Transition: The Years After DeGaulle, by Roy C. Macridis in Contemporary French Civilization, Fall 1976, pp. 168-170.
Law and Responsibility in Warfare: The Vietnam Experience, ed. by Peter D. Trooboff in Journal of Politics, November 1976, p. 1092.
Correspondence
“A Reply to Ersel Aydinli on the Role of the Turkish Military,” Middle East Journal, Winter 2010, pp. 164-66.
“A Reply to Judith E. Tucker’s Excerpt of Vahakn Dardian’s Article, “The Naim-Andonian Documents,” (IJMES 40 [2008]: 171-79; Reprint From IJMES 18 [1986]: 311-60), International Journal of Middle East Studies, November 2008, pp. 728-29.
“The Future of Kurdistan,” Azure: Ideas for the Jewish Nation, Spring 5768/2008, pp. 16-20. “It’s refreshing to see a brief and calmly stated summary of what actually happened from someone who isn’t paranoid and knows what he’s ... Resume/CV
Comment by Sukru Aya
.
3389) Ankara's Unacknowledged Genocide - Turkey, Past and Future
The ethnic cleansing of Turkish Armenia was accomplished in a variety of ways including deportations and outright massacres. Here, Armenian deportees struggle to survive in makeshift tents erected in the Syrian desert to which they were deported in 1915.
It is commonplace among Middle East scholars across the political spectrum to idealize the Ottoman colonial legacy as a shining example of tolerance. "The multi-ethnic Ottoman Turkish Empire," wrote American journalist Robert Kaplan, "was more hospitable to minorities than the uni-ethnic democratic states that immediately succeeded it … Violent discussions over what group got to control which territory emerged only when the empire came to an end, after World War I."[1] . . .
Bernard Lewis went a significant step further, ascribing the wholesale violence attending the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to attempts to reform its Islamic sociopolitical order. "The classical Ottoman Empire enabled a multiplicity of religious and ethnic groups to live side by side in mutual tolerance and respect, subject only to the primacy of Islam and the supremacy of the Muslims," he wrote. "The liberal reformers and revolutionaries who abolished the old order and proclaimed the constitutional equality of all Ottoman citizens led the Ottoman Empire into the final bitter and bloody national struggles—the worst by far in the half-millennium of its history."[2] And Edward Said, in an exceptional display of unanimity with his intellectual foe, was similarly effusive. "What they had then seems a lot more humane than what we have now," he argued. "Of course, there were inequities. But they lived without this ridiculous notion that every millet has to have its own state."[3]
Even Elie Kedourie, whose view of Ottoman colonialism was far less sentimental, could see some advantages in the empire's less than perfect sociopolitical order: "Ottoman administration was certainly corrupt and arbitrary, but it was ramshackle and inefficient and left many interstices by which the subject could hope to escape its terrors, and bribery was a traditional and recognized method of mitigating severities and easing difficulties."[4]
While there is no denying the argument's widespread appeal, there is also no way around the fact that, in almost every particular, it is demonstratively wrong. The imperial notion, by its very definition, posits the domination of one ethnic, religious, or national group over another, and the Ottoman Empire was no exception. It tolerated the existence of vast non-Muslim subject populations in its midst, as did earlier Muslim (and non-Muslim) empires—provided they acknowledged their legal and institutional inferiority in the Islamic order of things. When these groups dared to question their subordinate status—let alone attempt to break the Ottoman yoke—they were brutally suppressed, and none more so than the Armenians during World War I.
Historical Context
An important strand in Ottoman idealization has been the charge that it was the importation of European ideas to the empire, notably those of nationalism and statehood, that undermined the deeply ingrained regional order with devastating consequences to subjects and rulers alike. In Kedourie's words: "A rash, a malady, an infection spreading from Western Europe through the Balkans, the Ottoman empire, India, the Far East and Africa, eating up the fabric of settled society to leave it weakened and defenceless before ignorant and unscrupulous adventurers, for further horror and atrocity: Such are the terms to describe what the West has done to the rest of the world, not wilfully, not knowingly, but mostly out of excellent intentions and by example of its prestige and prosperity."[5]
Evocative of the fashionable indictment of nationalism as the scourge of international relations, this prognosis is largely misconceived. For it is the desire to dominate foreign creeds, nations, or communities, and to occupy territories well beyond the "ancestral homeland" that contains the inevitable seeds of violence—not the wish to be allowed to follow an independent path of development. In each of imperialism's three phases—empire-building, administration, and disintegration—force was the midwife of the historical process as the imperial power vied to assert its authority and to maintain its control over perennially hostile populations; and while most empires have justified their position in terms of a civilizing mission of sorts, none willfully shed its colonies, let alone its imperial status, well after they had outlived their usefulness, or had even become a burden. Hence the disintegration of multinational, multidenominational, and multilingual empires has rarely been a peaceful process. On rare occasions—the collapse of the Soviet Union being a salient example—violence has followed the actual demise of the imperial power. In most instances, however, such as the collapse of the British, the French, and the Portuguese empires, among others, violence is endemic to the process of decolonization as the occupied peoples fight their way to national liberation.
The Ottoman Empire clearly belonged to the latter category. A far cry from the tolerant and tranquil domain it is often taken for, Turkey-in-Europe was the most violent part of the continent during the century or so between the Napoleonic upheavals and World War I as the Ottomans embarked on an orgy of bloodletting in response to the nationalist aspirations of their European subjects. The Greek war of independence of the 1820s, the Danubian nationalist uprisings of 1848, the Balkan explosion of the 1870s, and the Greco-Ottoman war of 1897—all were painful reminders of the cost of breaking free from an imperial master.[6] And all pale in comparison with the treatment meted out to the foremost nationalist awakening in Turkey-in-Asia: the Armenian.
Prelude to Catastrophe
Unlike Europe, where the rise of nationalism dealt a body blow to Ottoman imperialism, there was no nationalist fervor among the Ottoman Empire's predominantly Arabic-speaking Afro-Asian subjects. One historian has credibly estimated that a mere 350 activists belonged to all the secret Arab societies operating throughout the Middle East at the outbreak of World War I, and most of them were not seeking actual Arab independence but rather greater autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.[7] This made the rise of Armenian nationalism the foremost threat to Ottoman integrity in that part of the empire.
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire totaled some two million persons, three-quarters of whom resided in so-called Turkish Armenia, namely, the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Kharput, and Diarbekir in eastern Anatolia. The rest, about half a million Armenians, were equally distributed in the Istanbul-eastern Thrace region and in Cilicia, in southwestern Anatolia.[8]
As a result of Russian agitation, European and American missionary work, and, not least, the nationalist revival in the Balkans, a surge of national consciousness began to take place within the three Armenian religious communities—Gregorian, Catholic, and Protestant. In the 1870s, Armenian secret societies sprang up at home and abroad, developing gradually into militant nationalist groups. Uprisings against Ottoman rule erupted time and again; terrorism became a common phenomenon, both against Turks and against noncompliant fellow Armenians—before it was eventually suppressed in a brutal campaign of repression in 1895-96, in which nearly 200,000 people perished and thousands more fled to Europe and the United States.
Turkish Armenia did not remain quiet for long. By 1903, a vicious cycle of escalating violence was in operation yet again, and two years later, Turkish sultan Abdul Hamid narrowly escaped an assassination attempt by Armenian nationalists. In the early 1910s, despite years of cultural repression, including a ban on the public use of the Armenian language and a new round of horrendous massacres (in the spring of 1909), Armenian nationalism had been fully rekindled. In April 1913, for example, Armenian nationalists asked Britain to occupy the southern region of Cilicia, from Antalya to Alexandretta, and to internationalize Istanbul and the straits as a means of "repairing the iniquity of the [1878] Congress of Berlin," which had stipulated Ottoman reforms "in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians." At about the same time, a committee of the Armenian National Assembly, the governing body of the Apostolic Ottoman Christians, submitted an elaborate reform plan for Ottoman Armenia to the Russian embassy in Istanbul.[9]
Bowing to international pressure, in February 1914, the Ottoman authorities accepted a Russo-German proposal for the creation of two large Armenian provinces, to be administered by European inspectors-general appointed by the great powers. This was a far cry from the Armenians' aspirations for a unified independent state as its envisaged territory was partitioned into two separate entities rather than creating a cohesive whole, yet it was the most significant concession they had managed to extract from their suzerain, and most of them were anxious to preserve this gain come what may. Hence, when the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the German-Austro-Hungarian Triple Alliance, the Armenians immediately strove to demonstrate their loyalty: Prayers for an Ottoman victory were said in churches throughout the empire, and the Armenian patriarch of Istanbul, as well as several nationalist groups, announced their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and implored the Armenian masses to perform their obligations to the best of their ability.
Not everyone complied with this wish. Scores of Ottoman Armenians, including several prominent figures, crossed the border to assist the Russian campaign. Others offered to help the Anglo-French-Russian entente by different means. In February 1915, for example, Armenian revolutionaries in the Cilician city of Zeitun pledged to assist a Russian advance on the area provided they were given the necessary weapons; to the British, they promised help in the event of a naval landing in Alexandretta.[10]
Although these activities were an exception to the otherwise loyal conduct of the Armenian community, they confirmed the Ottoman stereotype of the Armenians as a troublesome and treacherous people. This view was further reinforced by a number of crushing defeats in the Caucasus, in which (non-Ottoman) Armenians were implicated in the Russian war effort. Above all, as the largest nationally-aware minority in Asiatic Turkey, the Armenians constituted the gravest internal threat to Ottoman imperialism in that domain; and with Turkey-in-Europe a fading memory and Turkey-in-Africa under Anglo-French-Italian domination, the disintegration of Turkey-in-Asia would spell the end of the Ottoman Empire, something that its rulers would never accept.
Before long, the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to the kind of retribution that had been inflicted on rebellious Middle Eastern populations since Assyrian and Babylonian times: deportation and exile. Having been rendered defenseless, they were uprooted from their homes and relocated to the most inhospitable corners of Ottoman Asia, with their towns and villages swiftly populated by new Muslims arrivals, and their property seized by the authorities or plundered by their Muslim neighbors.
The Ethnic Cleansing of Turkish Armenia
The first step in this direction was taken in early 1915 when Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army were relegated to "labor battalions" and stripped of their weapons. Most of these fighters-turned-laborers would be marched out in droves to secluded places and shot in cold blood, often after being forced to dig their own graves. Those fortunate enough to escape summary execution were employed as laborers in the most inhumane conditions.
At the same time, the authorities initiated a ruthless campaign to disarm the entire Armenian population of personal weapons before embarking on a genocidal spree of mass deportations and massacres. By the autumn of 1915, Cilicia had been ethnically cleansed and the authorities turned their sights on the foremost Armenian settlement area in eastern Anatolia. First to be cleansed was the zone bordering Van, extending from the Black Sea to the Iranian frontier and immediately threatened by Russian advance; only there did outright massacres often substitute for otherwise slow deaths along the deportation routes or in the concentration camps of the Syrian desert. In other districts of Ottoman Armenia, depopulated between July and September, the Turks attempted to preserve a semblance of a deportation policy though most deportees were summarily executed after hitting the road. In the coastal towns of Trebizond, for example, Armenians were sent out to sea, ostensibly for deportation, only to be thrown overboard shortly afterward. Of the deportees from Erzerum, Erzindjan, and Baibourt, only a handful survived the initial stages of the journey.[11]
The Armenian population in western Anatolia and in the metropolitan districts of Istanbul was somewhat more fortunate as many people were transported in trains—although grossly overcrowded—for much of the deportation route, rather than having to straggle along by foot. In Istanbul, deportations commenced in late April when hundreds of prominent Armenians were picked up by the police and sent away, most of them never to be seen again; some five thousand "ordinary" Armenians soon shared their fate. Though the majority of the city's 150,000-strong community escaped deportation, Armenians were squeezed out of all public posts with numerous families reduced to appalling poverty. Deportations in Ankara began toward the end of July; in Broussa, in the first weeks of September; and in Adrianople, in mid-October. By early 1916, scores of deportees, thrown into a string of concentration camps in the Syrian desert and along the Euphrates, were dying every day of malnutrition and diseases; many others were systematically taken out of the camps and shot.[12]
The Ottoman authorities tried to put a gloss of legality and innocence on their actions. The general deportation decree of May 27, 1915, for example, instructed the security forces to protect the deportees against nomadic attacks, to provide them with sufficient food and supplies for their journey, and to compensate them with new property, land, and goods necessary for their resettlement. But this decree was a sham. For one thing, massacres and deportations had already begun prior to its proclamation. For another, as is overwhelmingly borne out by the evidence, given both by numerous firsthand witnesses to the Ottoman atrocities and by survivors, the rights granted by the deportation decree were never followed.
Consider the provisions for adequate supplies for the journey and compensation for the loss of property. After the extermination of the male population of a particular town or village, an act normally preceding deportations, the Turks often extended a "grace period" to the rest of the populace, namely, women, children, and the old and the sick, so they could settle their affairs and prepare for their journey. But the term normally given was a bare week, and never more than two, which was utterly insufficient for all that had to be done. Moreover, the government often carried away its victims before the stated deadline, snatching them without warning from streets, places of employment, or even their beds. Last but not least, the local authorities prevented the deportees from selling their property or their stock under the official fiction that their expulsion was to be only temporary. Even in the rare cases in which Armenians managed to dispose of their property, their Muslim neighbors took advantage of their plight to buy their possessions at a fraction of their real value.[13]
Nor did the deportees receive even a semblance of the protection promised by the deportation decree. On the contrary, from the moment they started on their march, indeed even before they had done so, they became public outcasts, never safe from the most atrocious outrages, constantly mobbed and plundered by the Muslim population as they straggled along. Their guards connived at this brutality. There were, of course, exceptions in which Muslims, including Turks, tendered help to the long-suffering Armenians, but these were very rare, isolated instances.
Whenever the deportees arrived at a village or town, they were exhibited like slaves in a public place, often before the government building itself. Female slave markets were established in the Muslim areas through which the Armenians were driven, and thousands of young Armenian women and girls were sold in this way. Even the clerics were quick to avail themselves of the bargains of the white slave market.
Suffering on the deportation routes was intense. Travelers on the Levantine railway saw dogs feeding on the bodies of hundreds of men, women, and children on both sides of the track, with women searching the clothing of the corpses for hidden treasure. In some of the transfer stations, notably Aleppo, the hub where all convoys converged, thousands of Armenians would be left for weeks outdoors, starving, waiting to be taken away. Epidemics spread rapidly, chiefly spot typhus. In almost all cases, the dead were not buried for days, the reason being, as an Ottoman officer cheerfully explained to an inquisitive foreigner, that it was hoped the epidemics might get rid of the Armenians once and for all.[14]
As the deportees settled into their new miserable existence, they were forced to work at hard labor, making roads, opening quarries, and the like; for this, they were paid puny salaries, which effectively reduced them to starvation; work in the neighboring villages that could earn them some livelihood was strictly forbidden. Water was normally brought to the camps by trains; no springs were to be found within a radius of miles. The scenes at the arrival of the water trains, by no means a regular phenomenon, were heartbreaking. Thousands of people would rush toward the stopping place, earth-jars and tin cans in hand, in a desperate bid for their share of this elixir of life. But when at long last the taps were opened, people would often be barred from filling their vessels, having to watch the precious water running out on the sun-baked ground.
Independent estimates of the precise extent of Armenian casualties differ somewhat, but all paint a stark picture of national annihilation. In his official report to the British parliament in July 1916, Viscount Bryce calculated the total number of uprooted Armenians during the preceding year as 1,200,000 (half slain, half deported), or about two thirds of the entire community. Johannes Lepsius, the chief of the Protestant Mission in the Ottoman Empire who had personally witnessed the atrocities and had studied them thoroughly, put the total higher, at 1,396,000, as did the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, which computed the number of deaths at about 600,000 and of deportees at 786,000. Aaron Aaronson, a world-renowned Zionist agronomist who set up the most effective pro-Anglo-French-Russian entente intelligence network in the Middle East during World War I, estimated the number of deaths at between 850,000 and 950,000.[15]
Genocide or "Collateral Damage"?
Turkey has never acknowledged any wrongdoing vis-à-vis the Armenians. While some leaders and administrators of the Young Turks regime, which ruled the empire since July 1908, were court-martialed immediately after the war for crimes committed during their ten-year rule, including the Armenian atrocities, this was done in deference to the victorious Allied powers rather than out of true conviction. Even the newly-established Turkish republic (1923), despite its renunciation of much of the Ottoman imperial legacy, would not disown its arguably most heinous crime since its founding father, Gen. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk "whatever his disagreements with the Young Turks leaders … was after all imbued with Young Turk ideas."[16] Not only did Ankara fail to acknowledge any intention or plan to destroy Armenian nationalism, but the deportations and killings were presented as a natural act of self-defense against a disloyal population. In the words of Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, doyen of Turkish historians: "It's one thing to say that the Turks killed the Armenians spontaneously, and another to say that, when the Armenians revolted, the Turks, who were locked in a life or death struggle, used excessive force and killed a good many people."[17]
Given their idealization of the Ottoman legacy, it was only a question of time for Western scholars to adopt this narrative.[18] "The Turks had an Armenian problem caused by the advance of the Russians and an anti-Ottoman population living in Turkey, which was seeking independence and openly sympathized with the Russians coming from the Caucasus," argued Lewis.
There were also Armenian gangs—the Armenians boast of the heroic feats performed by the resistance, and the Turks certainly had problems of maintaining order under wartime conditions. For the Turks, it was a matter of taking punitive and preventive measures against an unreliable population in a region threatened with foreign invasion.[19]
The distance from here to the substitution of perpetrators for victims and vice versa is short. In Lewis's words: "No one disputes that terrible things happened [and] that many Armenians—and also Turks—died. But the exact circumstances and the final tally of the victims will doubtless never be known."[20] Elsewhere, he described the episode as a result of "a desperate struggle … between two nations for the possession of a single homeland, that ended with the terrible slaughter of 1915, when, according to estimates, more than a million Armenians perished, as well as an unknown number of Turks."[21]
The nature of the conflict was of course quite different. Far from "a desperate struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland," it was a brutal repression by an imperial power of a subject population; and while Armenian national aspirations undoubtedly posed a grave threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, there can be no moral or political equivalence between these aspirations and their repression.
Moreover, even if most Armenians helped the Russian war effort, which they most certainly did not, there was no military—let alone moral—justification for the uprooting of almost an entire nation from its ancestral habitat, not to mention those communities that were far removed from the war zone (e.g., Cilicia, western Anatolia, etc.). Even the Nazis, who exacted horrendous collective punishment for acts of resistance, did not exile a single occupied nation from its homeland (apart, of course, from their Jewish citizens, singled out for collective destruction).
Nor for that matter is there any symmetry between the military (and other) resources at the empire's disposal and those available to its subjects, not least since states by definition control the means of collective violence. In the Armenian case, this inherent inequality was aggravated by the comprehensive disarming of the community; and while some "gangs" may have retained their weapons, the vast majority of Armenians surrendered them to the authorities despite their stark realization that the 1895-96 massacres had been preceded by very similar measures.
The ethnic cleansing of a virtually unarmed nation cannot, therefore, but indicate that, in the words of Turkish-American scholar Taner Akçam, "the wartime policies of the Ottoman government toward the Armenians were never … the result of military exigencies" but were rather the culmination of a preconceived design to destroy Armenian nationalism, for which war provided the ideal pretext.[22]
Drawing on a wealth of Ottoman, German, British, and U.S. documents, Akçam unveils a disturbing picture of elaborate planning and meticulous execution of Ottoman Armenia's ethnic cleansing. He traces this design to the Ottomans' defeat in the Balkan wars of 1912-13, which sealed their creeping expulsion from Europe and convinced the Young Turks leadership, dominated since January 1913 by the radical triumvirate—minister of war Enver Pasha, minister of the interior Talat Pasha, and minister of the navy Djemal Pasha—of the empire's imminent demise absent drastic homogenization of the Anatolian homeland: "The Christian population was to be reduced; that is, removed, and the non-Turkish Muslim groups were to be assimilated."[23]
This resulted in a campaign of massacres and expulsions against the Ottoman Greeks, suspended after November 1914 under German pressure, and culminating in the cleansing of the Armenians. The six historically Armenian provinces of eastern Anatolia were emptied of their inhabitants, who either perished on the harrowing track to exile or were resettled in the deserts of present-day Syria and Iraq. Most of the Cilician and West Anatolian Armenians endured a similar fate.
Akçam identifies a "dual track mechanism" used for the ethnic cleansing of the Armenians, and Christians more generally:
A legal track, comprising official state acts such as the bilateral population exchange agreements of 1913-14 with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, or the May 1915 decree authorizing the Armenian deportation. Representing Atatürk's subscription to the Young Turk belief in the need to homogenize the fatherland, the "legal" ethnic cleansing of the Anatolian Greeks was eventually completed by the 1923 population exchange that drove some 1.3 million Greeks out of Turkey (and about 400,000 Turks out of Greece).
An unofficial track, consisting of extrajudicial acts of violence, including forced evacuations, killing orders, and massacres. Maximum effort was expanded to create the impression that none of these actions were ever connected to the government, both during the war and in subsequent decades through systematic destruction of archival source material, yet the massive documentation provided by Akçam proves beyond a shadow of a doubt the deep involvement of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the Young Turks' ruling party—from local administrators and bureaucrats all the way to senior members, including Talat—in the orchestration and implementation of extrajudicial violence and massacres.[24]
Not that these findings should surprise anyone. For one thing, the "dual track mechanism" described by Akçam has remained a lasting feature of Turkish political life to this very day. In republican Turkey, this phenomenon has been known as the "deep state"—an opaque underworld where powerful elements within the state, especially the military and security services, act in conjunction with violent extremist groups and the apolitical criminal underworld to undertake special, illegal operations in the political interest of the country's ruling elite. For another, the antique imperial practice of exiling entire nations and communities has become an extreme rarity in modern times, precisely because of its deliberate genocidal intent to destroy "a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such."[25] It must have occurred to the Ottoman leadership that the exiling of almost an entire nation—over a million men, women, and children—to a remote, alien, and hostile environment amidst a general war without the minimal provisions for surviving the harrowing voyage and its aftermath, was tantamount to a collective death sentence.[26] In the end, whatever their initial intention, the Ottoman actions amounted to nothing short of genocide.
Conclusion
Few crimes against humanity have been so widely and so comprehensively ignored as the Ottoman Empire's ethnic cleansing of its Armenian population during World War I.
Mesmerized by the myth of a benevolent Ottoman colonialism (in stark contrast to their scathing indictment of the Western colonial legacy), Western scholars and intellectuals have turned a blind eye to the overwhelming body of evidence of Ottoman genocidal intentions and practices. For their part, Western politicians and leaders were loath to bring the Armenian skeleton out of the closet given Turkey's position as an important anti-Soviet bastion and an alluring bridge to the Muslim Middle East. And while the end of the Cold War has increased Western propensity to address the issue—in 2005 the European parliament conditioned Turkey's accession to the European Union on its recognition of the Armenian genocide[27]—Ankara has remained as defiant as ever.
When in March 2010 a U.S. congressional committee passed a resolution branding the Armenian massacres as "genocide," over the objections of the Obama administration, Turkey recalled its ambassador for "consultations."[28] In his 2008 election campaign, presidential hopeful Barack Obama stated that "America deserves a leader who speaks truthfully about the Armenian Genocide and responds forcefully to all genocides. I intend to be that President." As president, he chose to make Turkey the site of his first overseas trip ignoring the Armenian genocide altogether in his address to the Turkish parliament.[29] When in December 2011, France's lower chamber approved a bill making denial of any genocide a criminal offence, Ankara froze relations with Paris, recalling its ambassador and suspending all economic, political, and military meetings.[30]
With its strategic significance made more complex by recent Middle Eastern upheavals, and the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi, AKP) openly pining for lost Ottoman glories, Turkey is unlikely to shed this longtime denial and own up to its painful past.
Efraim Karsh, editor of the Middle East Quarterly, is professor of Middle East and Mediterranean studies at King's College London.
[1] Robert D. Kaplan, "At the Gates of Brussels," The Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2004.
[2] Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East (New York: Schocken Books, 1998), pp. 129-30.
[3] Moustafa Bayoumi and Andrew Rubin, eds., The Edward Said Reader (London: Granta Books, 2001), p. 430.
[4] Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies (Hanover and London: Brandeis University Press, 1984), p. 293.
[5] Ibid., p. 286.
[6] Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), chaps. 2, 5, 6.
[7] Eliezer Tauber, The Emergence of the Arab Movements (London: Frank Cass, 1993), chap. 28.
[8] For population figures, see, for example, Mallet to Grey, Oct. 7, 1914, British Foreign Office (hereafter FO), FO 371/2137/56940; "Turkey: Annual Report, 1913. By the Embassy," FO 371/2137/79138, 25.
[9] See Fontana to Lowther, Mar. 25, 1913, FO 371/1773/16941; Lowther to Grey, Apr. 5, 10, 1913, FO 371/1773/16736; Admiralty to FO, Apr. 15, 1913, FO 371/1775/17825.
[10] Ironside to Foreign Office, Mar. 3, 1915, and War Office to the Foreign Office, Mar. 4, 1915, FO 371/2484/25073 and 25167; Foreign Office to Ironside, Mar. 9, 1915, FO 371/2484/28172 and 22083.
[11] Karsh and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, chap. 10.
[12] Viscount Bryce, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Laid before the Houses of Parliament as an Official Paper and Now Published by Permission (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916), pp. 645-9.
[13] Ibid., pp. 641-2; Johannes Lepsius, Der Todesgang des armenischen Volkes (Potsdam: Missionshandlung und Verlag, 1930), pp. 301-4.
[14] Aaron Aaronson, "On the Armenian Massacres: Memorandum Presented to the War Office, London, Nov. 1916," Aaronson Archives (Zichron Yaacov, Israel), File 2C/14.
[15] Bryce, The Treatment of Armenians, pp. 649-51, "Annex F: Statistical Estimate Included in the Fifth Bulletin of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, Dated New York, 24th May 1916"; Johannes Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenian, 1914-1918 (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919), pp. lxv, 256; Lepsius, Der Todesgang, pp. 301-4; Aaron Aaronson, "Pro Armenia," Nov. 16, 1916, p. 13, Aaronson Archives, File 2C/13; Aaronson, "On the Armenian Massacres."
[16] Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 95-6.
[17] Taner Akçam, The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. xi.
[18] See, for example, Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 315; Guenther Lewy, "Revisiting the Armenian Genocide," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2005, pp. 3-12; Michael Gunter, Armenian History and the Question of Genocide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). See also Michael M. Gunter, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2013, pp. 37-46.
[19] Bernard Lewis, interview with Le Monde, Nov. 16, 1993.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 3rd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 356. Interestingly, in the first and second editions of the book (1961, 1968), Lewis described these tragic events as "the terrible holocaust of 1915, when a million and half Armenians perished." (p. 356). In his Le Monde interview, he reduced the fatality figure to "hundreds of thousands of Armenians [who] died of hunger and cold," dismissing the description of these deaths as genocide as "the Armenian version of this event." While he raised the figure to more than a million in the third edition of The Emergence, he still put Armenian casualties on a par with those of their Ottoman oppressors.
[22] Akçam, The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity, p. xix.
[23] Ibid., p. xv.
[24] Akçam's research also reaffirms the validity of early documentation of the Armenian atrocities whose authenticity has subsequently been questioned, notably Aram Andonian's 1920 book The Memoirs of Naim Bey, as many newly discovered documents echo their now discredited predecessors.
[25] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N. Treaty Series (UNTS) 277, entered into force on Jan. 12, 1951, art. 2.
[26] It has been argued (see Michael Gunter's article in this issue) that the claim of an Armenian genocide "rests on a logical fallacy and ignores the huge loss of life among Turkish civilians, soldiers, and prisoners-of-war. … that surely cannot be explained in terms of a Young Turk plan of annihilation." Of course, the Young Turks' indifference to their own people's suffering and mortality does not preclude the existence of an annihilationist plan vis-à-vis the Armenians, just as Hitler's readiness to sacrifice millions of German lives did not preclude his annihilationist design vis-à-vis the Jews.
[27] "European Parliament resolution on the opening of negotiations with Turkey," Sept. 38, 2005.
[28] "Armenian genocide resolution passes US Congress Committee," Voice of America, Mar. 3, 2010.
[29] "Barack Obama calls for passage of Armenian genocide resolution," Armenian National Committee of America, Jan. 20, 2008; remarks by President Obama to the Turkish parliament, Ankara, Office of the Press Secretary, Apr. 6, 2009.
[30] The Guardian, Dec. 22, 2011.
by Efraim Karsh
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2013, pp. 17-26
Source: http://www.meforum.org/
Provisional Comment by Sukru Aya
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